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Abstract
The revised Basel Capital Accord requires banks to meet a capital requirement for
operational risk as part of an overall risk-based capital framework. Three distinct options for
calculating operational risk charges are proposed (Basic Approach, Standardised Approach,
Advanced Measurement Approaches), reflecting increasing levels of risk sensitivity. Since
2001, the Risk Management Group of the Basel Committee has been performing specific
surveys of banks’ operational loss data, with the main purpose of obtaining information on
the industry’s operational risk experience, to be used for the refinement of the capital
framework and for the calibration of the regulatory coefficients. The second loss data
collection was launched in the summer of 2002: the 89 banks participating in the exercise
provided the Group with more than 47,000 observations, grouped by eight standardised
Business Lines and seven Event Types. A summary of the data collected, which focuses on
the description of the range of individual gross loss amounts and of the distribution of the
banks’ losses across the business lines/event types, was returned to the industry in March
2003. The objective of this paper is to move forward with respect to that document, by
illustrating the methodologies and the outcomes of the inferential analysis carried out on the
data collected through 2002. To this end, after pooling the individual banks’ losses according
to a Business Line criterion, the operational riskiness of each Business Line data set is
explored using empirical and statistical tools. The work aims, first of all, to compare the
sensitivity of conventional actuarial distributions and models stemming from the Extreme
Value Theory in representing the highest percentiles of the data sets: the exercise shows that
the extreme value model, in its Peaks Over Threshold representation, explains the behaviour
of the operational risk data in the tail area well. Then, measures of severity and frequency of
the large losses are gained and, by a proper combination of these estimates, a bottom-up
operational risk capital figure is computed for each Business Line. Finally, for each Business
Line and in the eight Business Lines as a whole, the contributions of the expected losses to
the capital figures are evaluated and the relationships between the capital charges and the
corresponding average level of Gross Incomes are determined and compared with the current
coefficients envisaged in the simplified approaches of the regulatory framework.
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1
Operational risk has become an area of growing concern in banking. The increase in
the sophistication and complexity of banking practices has raised both regulatory and
industry awareness of the need for an effective operational risk management and
measurement system. From the time of the release of the second consultative document on
the New Capital Accord in 2001, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has
established a specific treatment for operational risk: a basic component of the new
framework is represented by Pillar 1, which explicitly calls for a minimum capital charge for
this category of risk 
2.
The proposed discipline establishes various schemes for calculating the operational
risk charge, ranging from a crude Basic Approach, based on a fixed percentage of Gross
Income - the indicator selected by the Committee as a proxy of banks’ operational risk
exposure - passing through an intermediate Standardised Approach, which extends the Basic
method by decomposing banks’ activities and, hence, the capital charge computation, into
eight underlying business lines
3, to the most sophisticated approaches, the Advanced
Measurement Approaches (AMA), based on the adoption of banks’ internal models. The
framework gives banks a great deal of flexibility in the choice of the characteristics of their
internal models 
4, provided they comply with a set of eligible qualitative and quantitative
criteria and can demonstrate that their internal measurement systems are able to produce
reasonable estimates of unexpected losses.
                                                          
1 For the people who have no time to explore the whole paper, the reading of the Sections 1, 2, 10, 11 and 12
may suffice in order to have a quick understanding of the main, significant, topics dealt with in this analysis.
The author would like to thank Giovanni Carosio, Stefano de Polis, Paolo Zaffaroni, Fabrizio Leandri,
Giuseppe De Martino and two anonymous referee for comments and fruitful discussions and Giorgio Donato
for his careful reading and corrections, which helped the author in improving the final form of this paper. A
special thanks to Michele Romanelli who implemented the algorithms used for the bootstrapping and
conventional analysis. E-mail: marco.moscadelli@bancaditalia.it
2 The new Accord is based on a three Pillar concept, where Pillar 1 corresponds to a Minimal Capital
requirement, Pillar 2 stands for a Supervisory Review process and Pillar 3 concerns Market discipline.
3 The eight business lines established by the Accord are: Corporate Finance, Trading & Sales, Retail
Banking, Commercial Banking, Payment & Settlement, Agency Services, Asset Management and Retail
Brokerage.
4 The new discipline establishes that the capital calculation must be based on a sound combination of
qualitative and quantitative elements: internal data, relevant external data, scenario analysis and bank-specific
business environment and internal control factors.10
Since the first release of the new Basel proposal, regulators, practitioners and
academics have been engaged in discussion on how to define and measure operational risk
and, hence, how to determine appropriate capital requirements.
As regards the definition aspects, the Risk Management Group (RMG) of the Basel
Committee  and industry representatives have agreed on a standardised definition of
operational risk, i.e. “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes,
people and systems or from external events”. This definition, which includes legal risk and
excludes strategic and reputational risk, relies on the categorisation of operational risks
based on the underlying causes. A standardised classification matrix of operational risk into
eight Business Lines (BLs) and seven Event Types (ETs) has also been defined, in order to
encourage greater consistency of loss data collection within and between banks.
As regards the measurement issue, a growing number of articles, research papers and
books have addressed the topic from a theoretical point of view. In practice, this objective is
made hard by the relatively short period over which operational risk data have been gathered
by banks; obviously, the greatest difficulty is in collecting information on infrequent, but
large losses, which, on the other hand, contribute the most to the capital charge. The need to
evaluate the exposure to potentially severe tail events is one of the reasons why the new
Capital framework requires banks to supplement internal data with further sources (external
data, scenario analysis) in order to compute their operational risk capital charge.
Since 2001, the RMG has been performing surveys of banks’ operational loss data,
with the main purpose of obtaining information on the industry’s operational risk experience,
useful for improving the capital framework and calibrating the regulatory coefficients. In
particular, the second Loss Data Collection Exercise (2002 LDCE), serving to collect the
operational risk losses borne by banks in the financial year 2001, was an extension and
refinement of the previous exercises sponsored by the RMG 
5. Overall, 89 banks participated
in the 2002 survey, providing the RMG with more than 47,000 observations, mapped in the
standardised matrix BLs/ETs. Feedback on the data collected, which focuses on the
description of the range of individual gross loss amounts and of the distribution of these
                                                          
5 A description of the information collected in the previous exercises can be found in the “Working Paper on
the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk” released in September 2001 and in the paper “The Quantitative11
losses across the BLs/ETs categories, was provided to industry in March 2003 (see the
document “The 2002 Loss Data Collection Exercise for Operational Risk: Summary of the
Data Collected”, published on the BIS website).
The objective of the present paper is to move forward with respect to that document,
by illustrating the methodologies and the outcomes of the inferential analysis carried out on
the operational risk losses collected through 2002. In order to statistically explore the data,
first a pooling exercise of the banks’ losses according to a BL criterion is performed, then
the operational riskiness of each BL data set is examined by means of empirical and
statistical tools. Several practical and theoretical reasons support this choice rather than
exploring any or some individual banks’ database. From a practical point of view, the
objective of measuring and comparing the operational riskiness of the BLs in addition to that
of providing protection to the confidentiality of the LDCE banks’ data. From a theoretical
point of view, the fact that the aggregation of banks’ operational risk data, collected in short
time windows (1-year, say), is a viable solution to actually overcome the threats of non-
repetitiveness and dependence of the observations, which typically affect any individual
banks’ historical database; furthermore, each BL data set, obtained by assembling 1-year
period data from n banks having similar size and characteristics (the 2002 LDCE banks), can
be thought as referred to a medium-sized (large internationally active) bank and collected
over a time window of n-year. In practice, by a cross-section pooling procedure, long time-
series of i.i.d. operational risk data are reproduced.
The first purpose of the work is to compare the sensitivity of conventional actuarial
distributions and models stemming from the Extreme Value Theory (EVT) in representing
the extreme percentiles of the data sets (i.e. the large losses). Then, measures of severity and
frequency of the large losses in each data set are gained and, by a proper combination of
these estimates, a bottom-up operational risk capital charge is computed. Finally, for each
BL and in the eight BLs as a whole, the contributions of the expected losses to the capital
figures are evaluated and the relationships between the capital charges and the corresponding
average level of Gross Incomes are determined and compared with the current regulatory
coefficients.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Impact Study for Operational Risk: Overview of Individual Loss Data and Lessons Learned”, released in
January 2002. Both the papers are available on the BIS website (www.bis.org).12
It is evident that the reliability of the exercise is strictly connected with the (unknown)
actual quality of the overall data, which, as the 2002 LDCE summary stresses, have been
gathered by banks according to different levels of consistency.
The results indicate a low performance of conventional actuarial severity models in
describing the overall data characteristics, summarizable in very high levels of both
skewness to the right and kurtosis. Indeed, any traditional distribution applied to all the data
in each BL tends to fit central observations, hence not taking the large losses into adequate
consideration. On the other hand, the exercise shows that the Extreme Value model, in its
severity representation (Peaks Over Threshold-Generalised Pareto Distribution, POT-GPD),
provides an accurate estimate of the actual tail of the BLs at the 95
th  and higher percentiles;
this is confirmed by the results of three goodness-of-fit tests and a severity VaR performance
analysis.
The POT-GPD model reveals that, while each BL severity riskiness increases
substantially at the highest percentiles because of the heaviness of the tail, the ranking of the
riskiness of the BLs does not change significantly. In particular Corporate Finance and
Commercial Banking are found to be the riskiest BLs with an estimated severity loss at the
99.9
th  percentile of € 260 million and € 151 million, respectively. On the other hand, Retail
Banking and Retail Brokerage are the least risky BLs, showing severity loss at the 99.9
th
percentile of € 17 million and € 27 million respectively.
In light of its supremacy in the estimate of the loss tail-severity distribution, the
Extreme Value model, in its Peaks Over Threshold - Point Process representation (POT-PP),
is also used to estimate the loss tail-frequency distribution, that is to derive the probability of
occurrence of the large losses in each BL.
The results show the significant per-bank variability of the number of large losses in
each BL. The reasons for this may be found in the different level of comprehensiveness in
the collection of (large) losses between the banks participating in the RMG survey and
perhaps also in the short time horizon of the 2002 LDCE (1-year data collection), which
might have caused, for some banks, a few gaps in the collection of very rare and large losses.
Another likely cause of the variability of the frequency of large losses could lie in the
participation, in the 2002 LDCE, of banks having different size and hence potentially in a13
position to produce, in some BLs, a lower or higher number of large losses in a given time
horizon. These issues are specifically addressed in this paper and their, potential, misleading
effects on the estimate of the BLs frequency of large losses mitigated. In particular the
possible incompleteness of very large losses is overcome by placing a floor on the, 1-year
period, probability of occurrence of the losses with a single-impact magnitude bigger than
the 99
th percentile of the severity distribution: the floor is represented by the number of large
losses occurring at the 99
th percentile of the frequency distribution. The potential differences
in banks’ size is treated by assuming the existence in the panel of two distinct groups of
banks – a “lower group”, consisting of banks having smaller size (in fact domestic banks),
and an “upper group”, consisting of banks having larger size (in fact internationally active
banks) – for which separate analyses are made on the basis of the estimated, distinct, 1-year
numbers of large losses. In particular, for a typical international active bank, the model
reveals about 60 losses bigger than € 1 million per year; this figure is absolutely comparable
with that actually borne by large internationally active banks.
On the basis of the POT tail severity and frequency estimates, an aggregate figure for
each BL and for the eight BLs as a whole is computed by means a semiparametric approach.
The POT approach appears to be a viable solution to reduce the estimate error and the
computational costs related to the not analytical techniques, like the MonteCarlo simulation,
usually implemented in the financial industry to reproduce the highest percentiles of the
aggregate loss distribution. The findings clearly indicate that operational losses represent a
significant source of risk for banks, given a 1-year period capital charge against expected
plus unexpected losses at the 99.9
th percentile which amounts to € 1,325 million for a typical
international active bank and to € 296 million for a domestic bank. Owing to the higher
frequency of losses, Retail Banking and Commercial Banking are the BLs which absorb the
majority of the overall capital figure (about 20 per cent each), while Corporate Finance and
Trading & Sales are at an intermediate level (respectively close to 13 per cent and 17 per
cent) and the other BLs stay stably under 10 per cent. These figures are comparable with the
allocation ratios of economic capital for operational risk reported by banks in the 2002
LDCE (see Table 21 of the cited summary). Moreover, the results show the very small
contribution of the expected losses to the total capital charge: on average across the BLs,
they amount to less than 3 per cent of the overall capital figure for an international active14
bank, with a minimum value of 1.1 per cent in Corporate Finance and a maximum of 4.4 per
cent in Retail Banking. Once again, these outcomes confirm the very tail-driven nature of
operational risk.
Finally, for the banks belonging to the “upper group” (the international active banks),
the relationships between the BLs overall capital figures and the average level of the Gross
Incomes are computed and compared with the current regulatory coefficients envisaged in
the Basic and Standardised Approach of the Capital Accord (the so-called Alpha and Betas).
For the eight BLs as a whole, the results show a slightly lower ratio than the current
regulatory coefficient, hence giving an incentive to move from the Basic to the Standardised
Approach and meeting, at the same time, the objective of not increasing the industry overall
level of capital requirement for operational risk. Nevertheless, adjustment of the coefficient
of some BLs might more effectively capture the actual operational riskiness shown by the
data (in particular, a sizable reduction in the Trading & Sales and Retail Banking and an
increase in the Payment & Settlement and Retail Brokerage Betas).
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the main characteristics of the
raw data used in the work and the choices made in terms of data assumption and treatment;
in Section 3 each BLs data set is explored by an empirical analysis which focuses on a
bootstrapping procedure and a graphical representation of the density function of the BLs;
Section 4 illustrates the main results of the conventional inference on the severity of losses;
Section 5 describes the theoretical background of EVT, while Sections 6, 7 and 8 are
devoted to estimate, test and measure the tail-severity of the eight BLs by the POT-GPD
model. Section 9 is devoted to computing the probability of occurrence of the tail of the BLs,
by means of the frequency component of the POT approach (POT-PP). In Section 10 the
capital charge of the BLs against expected plus unexpected losses is computed and compared
with the contribution pertaining to expected losses alone. Section 11 focuses on the
relationship between the estimated capital figures of the BLs and the pertaining average level
of Gross Incomes. Section 12 concludes.15
2. Data characteristics and assumptions
The data used for the analysis are those collected in the 2002 LDCE by the RMG,
which required the 89 banks participating in the survey to provide individual gross
operational losses above the threshold of  €10,000 for the year 2001, grouped by quarters.
In order to statistically explore these data, all the individual banks’ data were pooled
according to a BL criterion, leading to eight distinct data sets, each one relative to a different
BL. Practical and theoretical reasons determined the decision to pool the individual banks’
data by BLs:
a)  the need to protect the confidentiality of the individual banks’ losses;
b)  the need to have, for each data set, a number of losses high enough to be modelled;
c)  the objective of assessing and comparing the operational riskiness of the eight BLs.
In doing so, it may be that, due to the particular nature of operational risk, a few
inconsistencies in some loss data sets may have arisen (e.g. how should the riskiness
stemming from pooling very different ETs as Internal Fraud and Damage to Physical Assets
be interpreted ?). Anyway, it should be observed that data inconsistencies could also arise
from pooling losses according to an ET criterion (Internal Fraud in Trading & Sales, for
example, seems to appear completely different from Internal Fraud in Retail Banking) or
simply from handling data referred to a specific BL/ET combination, originating from banks
with very different operational risk profiles.
Moreover, it should be noted that, since operational risk spreads over the different
activities of a bank organisation, any loss analysis is potentially exposed to the threat of
inconsistencies of data, when they refer to sources that are not properly categorised: the
problem, which could condition the quality and the results of the inference, therefore lies
within banks and only later between banks. Sound practices require banks to conduct a
rigorous and detailed classification of their products, functions and processes and to adopt a
clear and widespread definition of operational risk in their organisational units before any
loss event identification and mapping is conducted and a statistical analysis of losses is made
(on the issues of operational risk definition and categorisation, see, for example, Samad-
Khan, 2003).16
Table 1 reports the results of the pooling exercise for each BL, in terms of the number
of banks providing at least one loss figure and the total number of observations.
Table  1:  BLs data pooling exercise
Overall, the number of observations after the pooling exercise is 45,569, a value
slightly lower than that of the 2002 LDCE, the difference being caused by the decision to
exclude data not having a business line breakdown (1,699 observations, see Table 3 of the
2002 LDCE summary) as well 1 observation in BL8, which proves to be an outlier. In BL4,
5 out of 3,414 observations tend to be outliers, too: even if kept in the sample, they are not
taken into consideration in the fitting exercise, and are considered only in the VaR
performance analysis made in Section 7.
Each data set, referred to a distinct BL, can be considered as a sample extracted from
the corresponding unknown population, whose properties, characteristics and riskiness are to
be detected and compared. It is assumed that, in each BL, the observations are the
realisations of independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables.
The issue of not dependence of the operational risk losses, like the non-stationarity,
and its possible effect on the modelling exercise has been more recently addresses by






BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 33 423
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 67 5,132
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 80 28,882
BL 4  (Commercial Banking) 73 3,414
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 55 1,852
BL 6  (Agency Services) 40 1,490
BL 7  (Asset Management) 52 1,109
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 41 3,26717
structural changes of operational losses both in survival bias 
6 and in changes in banks
external/internal environment (e.g. changes in the economic cycle, volume of business, or
organisational or internal control systems). As the authors state, the non-stationarity
condition can distort the results of the applied statistical models, which are mainly based on
the i.i.d. assumption: the authors therefore stress the importance of modelling the non-
stationarities of data before a statistical analysis can be made.
In the current exercise, the data independence assumption is mainly based on the idea
that any pooling exercise of banks’ operational risk losses collected in a reasonably short
time (say, 1 or 2 years), can in fact mitigate the threat of dependence of the data, which, on
the contrary, might be present in individual banks’ historical data-bases. This assumption
arises from the consideration that the operational risk losses usually occur independently in
each bank, as they are mainly caused by banks internal drivers (process, human resource and
internal system). Moreover, if the losses refer to moderately short time horizons (e.g. 1 or 2
years), the risks of non-stationarity of each bank’s database - caused, as noted before, by
possible survival bias or changes in the bank’s external/internal environment as time evolves
– should also be reduced 
7.
The identically distributed data assumption is based on the consideration that banks
having characteristics not too dissimilar (as the banks participating in the 2002 LDCE) are
not distinguishable by the severity of losses, since they are indifferently exposed to losses of
any size 
8.
                                                          
6 Survival or selection bias is defined as the fact that operational losses that occurred some distance in the
past have not survived in current bank databases. As the authors state, the early losses seem not only sparser,
but also larger. In practice, one only remembers the largest losses (on this topic, see also Embrechts et al.,
2004).
7  With regard to event types caused by bank external drives, some form of dependence between data
collected from different banks may arise (e.g. an earthquake can contemporaneously damage the physical assets
of several banks).  However, in this exercise, the data independent assumption for such events was tested and
verified on the eight BLs (see Section 3 below). On the data dependence, the interested readers can see the
examples discussed by Embrechts and Samorodnitsky, 2002,  or the analysis conducted by Ebnother et al.,
2001, aimed to assess the impact of specific risk factors (i.e. fraud, system failures, error, external catastrophes)
on several production processes.
8  In this exercise the issue of the potential non-homogeneity of the operational risk data is addressed only with
regard to the frequency component of losses (see Section 9 below, in particular footnote 36). The similarities in
the loss severity across the 2002 LDCE banks have been also detected by de Fontnouvelle et al. (2004), which
have recently examined the empirical regularities of operational risk in six large international active banks
participating in the survey launched by the Basel Committee.18
As a result of the pool exercise and the i.i.d. assumptions, two practical features
originate:
1.  the overcome of the threat of the non-repetitiveness of the losses, which indeed
represents one of the biggest concerns in the statistical treatment of the operational risk
data (see Embrecths et al., 2003);
2.  the fact that the collection of 1-year period data from n banks having similar sizes and
characteristics can reasonably represent the collection of n-year period data referred to a
bank having average size and characteristics. Under this perspective, the current analysis
assumes thus that the pool of 1-year period data from the 89 banks participating in the
2002 LDCE (cross-section analysis) is equivalent to the collection of  data from a
medium-sized LDCE bank during a time window of 89-years (time-series analysis). In
other words the whole data set can be thought of as referred to a large internationally
active bank and collected over time.
3. Exploratory data analysis
A preliminary exploratory analysis of the operational raw data is conducted in order to
gain information on the actual underlying structure of the severity of the eight BL data sets.
In particular, owing to the known nature of operational risk and to the ultimate goal of
assessing the  riskiness of the BLs, the analysis focuses on the evaluation of the levels of
asymmetry and tail-heaviness of the data sets (that is measures of skewness and kurtosis)
rather than on the location and scale.
In addition, instead of exploring the eight-pooled data sets, new data groups are
generated from the original ones on the basis of a  bootstrapping procedure. The aim is
twofold: to strengthen the informative power of the raw data on the unknown moments of
the population and, above all, to provide further protection to the confidentiality of the losses
                                                                                                                                                                                  
As a general rule, if substantial differences in terms of the behaviour of the losses were detected for some
banks, suitable statistical treatments (so-called “scaling methodologies”) would be required to make data
comparable and to ensure that merging all the individual databases leads to unbiased estimates (for a recent
scaling proposal, see Frachot and Roncalli, 2002, who address the problem of mixing banks internal and
external data).19
reported by the individual banks in the 2002 LDCE 
9. In practice, a resampling technique
with replacement is applied to each original BL data set. The steps of the bootstrap are the
following:
a)  generating a random number from integers 1, 2,…,n, where n is the BL sample size.
Let j be this number;
b)  obtaining the j-th member of the original sample;
c)  repeating the first 2 steps n times (because of replacement, the same value from the
original sample may be selected more than once);
d)  computing the parameter estimates from these n new values;
e)  repeating 1,000 times steps 1 through 4.
The large number of bootstrapping estimates can be considered as a random sample
from the sampling distribution of each parameter estimator being calculated: the mean of the
bootstrap samples is a good indicator of the expected value of the estimator.
In Table 2, the outcomes of the bootstrapping procedure are reported:
Table 2: BLs bootstrapping results
                                                          
9 As regard the first purpose, according to the bootstrap theory, this procedure provides a reliable indication
of the properties of the population parameters estimator (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). Concerning the
confidentiality issue, the replacement of the raw data estimates with the bootstrapped ones definitevely
removes the risk of an individual bank being identifiable due to its relative importance in the determination of
some moments of the BLs.
BUSINESS LINE
Mean       
(euro ,000)
Standard deviation  
(euro ,000)
Skewness Kurtosis
BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 646 6,095 16 294
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 226 1,917 23 674
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 79 877 55 4,091
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  356 2,642 15 288
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 137 1,320 24 650
BL 6  (Agency Services) 222 1,338 13 211
BL 7  (Asset Management) 195 1,473 25 713
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 125 1,185 32 1,23220
The estimates of the bootstrapped moments indicate that the empirical distributions of
the eight BLs are very skewed to the right and, above all, very heavy in the tail. In order to
better appreciate the peculiarities of these data, it should be remembered that the skewness
and the kurtosis of a standard LogNormal distribution are equal, respectively, to 6 and 114.
Therefore, despite the short time-window of the 2002 LDCE, the pooled data sets
appear to capture the large-impact events, a very important pre-condition for obtaining
consistent estimates of the capital figures. One reason may be the circumstance that the
reference year for the 2002 LDCE was 2001, the year of the September 11
th  terroristic
attack. As the 2002 LDCE summary paper remarks “.. the distribution of gross loss amounts,
in particular, is likely to be sensitive to the incidence of relatively few very large-impact
events. This phenomenon is certainly evident in the 2001 data, which contain some large
individual loss amounts associated with events of September 11, for example” 
10. In light of
that, it may be that, owing to the September 11
th event, the pooled data sets violate the
assumption of independence of the observations. In reality, a deeper analysis conducted on
the pooled data clearly indicates that the very large losses are spread out across the BLs and
do not converge to one or just a few BLs 
11. In any case, the assumption that, in each BL data
set, the observations are independent should be preserved or, at most, moderately weakened.
In order to have a preliminary idea on the graphical behaviour of the losses, a kernel
smoothing technique 
12  was performed for each original (that is, before the bootstrapping)
BL data set. The kernel procedure makes it possible to obtain a nice graphical representation
of the BLs density function, by smoothing the histogram figure driven by the original data
(see Figure 1). In practice, a probability value is assigned to each observation based on the
mass of data close to it: the denser the data close to the observation whose probability is to
be evaluated, the higher the probability assigned.
                                                          
10 Table 6 of that paper shows that more than three-quarters of the total gross loss arise from only 2.5 per cent
of the events.
11 The reason could lie in the fact that the losses, even if caused by just a few common drivers (as, for istance,
the September 11
th attack) may have affected distinct businesses of the banks (i.e., the September 11
th event
may have affect the different activities conducted by the banks in the Twin Towers building).   
12 The Epanechnikov kernel was used.21
Figure 1: kernel density function for some BLs
The kernel density functions clearly show the skewness of the data, but not the
kurtosis.
4. Conventional inference: Business Lines tail-severity estimate
It should be first observed that the cut-off limits (€ 10,000) established in the 2002
LDCE to report losses are not taken into account in modelling the severity of the data. The
reason mainly lies in the fact that some banks used different minimum cut-off levels in
providing the RMG with their data; therefore each BL pooled data set also contains losses
below the threshold of  € 10,000. Moreover, as it will become clearer in the remainder of this
paper, given the actual nature of the operational risk losses, any statistical model which
correctly represents the body of the data (that is the small/medium-sized losses) may have
serious drawbacks in fitting the tail area. In the light of the objective of the analysis, i.e. to
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gain information on the tail magnitude of the eight BLs, the choice between a ground-up, a
truncated or a shifted distribution to estimate the severity of the data becomes immaterial 
13.
The aim of this section is to apply, separately for each BL, conventional inference to
the original pooled data, bearing in mind the ultimate goal of detecting the curve that best
explains the behaviour of the severity of losses in the tail area. This is done by fitting
parametric distributions to the eight overall data sets and obtaining a parameters estimate
that optimises the criterion of maximum likelihood.
Several distributions are fitted to the data, according to an increasing level of kurtosis,
i.e. starting from light-tail distributions (as Weibull), passing through medium-tail curves (as
Gamma, Exponential, Gumbel and LogNormal) to heavy-tail models (as Pareto).
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Anderson-Darling (A-D) tests are adopted to
reject or to accept the null hypothesis that the data originate from the selected distribution
with the estimated parameters. In light of the objectives of the exercise, the A-D test seems
to be more suitable because it is much more sensitive to the tails of data.
14
The results indicate that Gumbel and LogNormal are the distributions that best fit the
data in each BL. Both lighter-tail (as Gamma) and heavier-tail (as Pareto) functions result in
much higher test values.
In Figure 2, referred to BL1 (Corporate Finance), the plots of the Gumbel and
LogNormal cumulative distribution functions can be compared with the empirical











) ( , i.e. the number of observations less than or equal to x divided by n.
The LogNormal curve seems to provide a reasonable fit to the whole data set, while the
Gumbel curve fits poorly in the body of the data but better in the tail.
                                                          
13 Frachot and Roncalli, 2002, and Baud et al., 2002, discuss these and other related issues in the context of
pooling internal and external databases which are truncated from below.
14 The attractive feature of the K-S test is that it is “distribution free”, in the sense that the critical values do
not depend on the specific distribution being tested. Despite that, it has the disadvantage of being more
sensitive near the center of the distribution than at the tails. On the other hand, the A-D test makes use of any
specific distribution in calculating critical values. The A-D advantage of allowing a more sensitive test would
thus seem to be counterbalanced by the burden of calculating, different, critical values for each distribution to
be investigated. In reality, the differences between the A-D test values are not so important: for example, the
tabulated A-D test values for LogNormal, Gumbel and Weibull differ only at the third decimal.23
Figure 2: BL1 (Corporate Finance).  LogNormal and Gumbel fit
In fact, from this picture it is difficult to investigate if the selected distributions provide
a good fit in the region we are most interested in, that is the tail area. When the graphical
analysis is limited to the tail, i.e. the last 10 per cent of the distribution, it can immediately
be seen that both distributions fit the data very poorly: LogNormal underestimates the
empirical, actual, tail from the 90
th  percentile, Gumbel from the 96
th  percentile (see Figure
3).
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If the analysis is performed on an another BL (BL3: Retail Banking), it is easy to see,
by graphical analysis, the poor fit of both the distributions in the tail area: LogNormal
underestimates the tail from the 90
th  percentile, Gumbel from the 96
th  (see Fig. 4).
Figure 4: BL 3 (Retail Banking). LogNormal and Gumbel fit (focus on the tail)
This phenomenon does not change if the other BLs are considered (Figure 5 shows the
tail fit for BL6, BL7 and BL8).
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The goodness-of-fit test values for the LogNormal and Gumbel distributions, reported
in Table 3, confirm the graphical perception: in all the BLs, the test values are much higher
than the critical ones, at both the 90 per cent and 99 per cent significance levels (the BLs test
values are highlighted in yellow if higher than the critical ones. In Table 3 only the critical
values for α  = 90 per cent are reported). The biggest differences can be observed for the A-D
values, owing to the greater weight this test gives to the distance between the estimated and
the empirical distribution function in the tail area.
 Table 3: Conventional inference results
The main lesson learnt from modelling the severity of operational risk losses by
conventional inference methods is that, even though some selected distributions fit the body
of the data well, these distributions would underestimate the severity of the data in the tail
area: the extent of this error will be investigated in Section 8, where a severity VaR
performance analysis is employed.
In practice, the considerable skewness to the right of the empirical distribution causes
each curve parameters estimate to be mainly influenced by the observations located in the
left and middle area of the empirical distribution, hence reducing the informative power of
the data located in the tail area and providing lower than actual figures for the extreme













BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 423 3.58 1.71 0.18 22.52 93.96 602.30 0.43 124.62 0.06 0.63
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 5,132 3.64 1.27 0.14 180.52 51.76 185.25 0.37 1,224.03 0.02 0.63
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 28,882 3.17 0.97 0.18 1,653.03 25.63 58.80 0.34 6,037.35 0.01 0.63
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  3,414 3.61 1.41 0.16 173.94 48.30 203.53 0.37 830.57 0.02 0.63
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 1,852 3.37 1.10 0.15 73.74 35.86 109.93 0.36 436.48 0.03 0.63
BL 6  (Agency Services) 1,490 3.74 1.28 0.12 46.33 54.82 181.19 0.35 332.74 0.03 0.63
BL 7  (Asset Management) 1,109 3.79 1.28 0.11 25.68 56.78 153.72 0.32 203.94 0.04 0.63
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 3,267 3.58 1.08 0.12 87.67 41.03 93.51 0.31 576.51 0.02 0.63
Critical values             








quantiles. In such a situation, using all the observations to measure the size of the tail could
be therefore misleading.
5. Extreme Value Theory: theoretical background
As seen in the conventional inference, the influence of the small/medium-sized losses
in the curve parameters estimate does not permit models that fit the tail data accurately to be
obtained. An obvious solution to this problem is not to take into consideration the body of
the distribution, focusing the analysis only on the large losses. In practice large and
small/medium-sized losses are treated separately. If one is interested in obtaining
information on some average values of the distribution, conventional or empirical analysis
on the data located in the small/medium-sized region may be used (in the current exercise,
for example, the outcomes of the conventional inference will be used to derive the expected
losses of the BLs, see Section 10 below).
Concerning the tail area, quite a number of different distributions could be adopted; for
example, LogNormal and Pareto curves are commonly accepted in insurance to model large
claims. However, in this analysis, extreme distributions, stemming from the Extreme Value
Theory (EVT), are utilised. The reason lies in the fact that EVT has solid foundations in the
mathematical theory of the behaviour of extremes and, moreover, many applications have
indicated that EVT appears to be a satisfactory scientific approach in treating rare, large
losses. It has been widely applied in structural engineering, oceanography, hydrology,
reliability, total quality control, pollution studies, meteorology, material strength, highway
traffic and, more recently, in the financial and insurance fields
15. For a comprehensive source
on the application of EVT to finance and insurance, see Embrechts et al., 1997, and Reiss
and Thomas, 2001.
In general, operational risk losses undoubtedly present characteristics analogous to
data originating from the above-mentioned fields (immediate analogies, for example, can be
                                                          
15 In recent years, there have been a number of extreme value studies and applications in finance and
insurance: for example McNeil studies the estimation of the tails of loss severity distributions (1997), examines
the quantile risk measures for financial time series (1998) and provides an extensive overview of the extreme
value theory for risk managers (1999); Embrechts studies the potentials and limitations of the extreme value
theory (1999 and 2000); McNeil and Frey study the estimation of tail-related risk measures for heteroschedastic
financial time series (2000).27
found in insurance, reinsurance, reliability  and total quality control). In fact, operational risk
data appear to be characterised by two “souls”: the first one, driven by high-frequency low-
impact events, constitutes the body of the distribution and refers to expected losses; the
second one, driven by low-frequency high-impact events, constitutes the tail of the
distribution and refers to unexpected losses. In practice, the body and the tail of data do not
necessarily belong to the same, underlying, distribution or even to distributions belonging to
the same family. More often their behaviour is so different that it is hard to identify a unique
traditional model that can at the same time describe, in an accurate way, the two “souls” of
data: the conventional inference on the BLs  whole data sets in Section 4 furnishes a clear
proof  of  that 
16.
Consequently, in all the cases in which the tail tends “to speaks for itself”, EVT
appears to be an useful inferential instrument with which to investigate the large losses,
owing to its double property of focusing the analysis only on the tail area (hence reducing
the disturbance effect of the small/medium-sized data) and treating the large losses by an
approach as scientific as the one driven by the Central Limit Theorem for the analysis of the
high-frequency low-impact losses 
17. Clearly, EVT is not a “panacea”, since specific
conditions are required for its application and even  then it is still open to some criticisms,
extensively investigated in the literature (on this topic, see for example Embrechts et al.,
1997, Diebold et al., 1998, and Embrechts et al., 2003).
Unlike traditional methods, EVT does not require particular assumptions on the nature
of the original underlying distribution of all the observations, which is generally unknown.
EVT is applied to real data in two related ways.
The first approach (see Reiss and Thomas, 2001, p. 14 ff) deals with the maximum (or
minimum) values the variable takes in successive periods, for example months or years.
                                                          
16 Some mixture distributions could be investigated in order to identify a model that provides a reasonable fit
to both the body and the tail of data. However, the disadvantage of such distributions is that they are more
complex and, hence, less easy to handle. Furthermore a mixture model would be an arbitrary choice, not
supported by a robust theory and, because of that, one would have less confidence in extrapolating the
outcomes beyond the empirical data.
17 To cite, respectively, Diebold et al., 1998, and Smith, 1987, “EVT helps the analyst to draw smooth curves
through the extreme tails of empirical survival functions in a way that is guided by powerful theory and hence
provides a rigorous complement to alternatives such as graphical analysis or empirical survival functions” and
“There is always going to be an element of doubt, as one is extrapolating into areas one doesn’t know about.
But what EVT is doing is making the best use of whatever data you have about extreme phenomenon”.28
These observations constitute the extreme events, also called block (or per-period) maxima.
At the heart of this approach is the “three-types theorem” (Fisher and Tippet, 1928), which
states that there are only three types of distributions which can arise as limiting distributions
of extreme values in random samples: the Weibull type, the Gumbel type and the Frechet
type. This result is very important, since the asymptotic distribution of the maxima always
belongs to one of these three distributions, regardless of the original one. Therefore the
majority of the distributions used in finance and actuarial sciences can be divided into these
three classes, according to their tail-heaviness:
•   light-tail distributions with finite moments and tails, converging to the Weibull curve
(Beta, Weibull);
•   medium-tail distributions for which all moments are finite and whose cumulative
distribution functions decline exponentially in the tails, like the Gumbel curve (Normal,
Gamma, LogNormal);
•   heavy-tail distributions, whose cumulative distribution functions decline with a power in
the tails, like the Frechet curve (T-Student, Pareto, LogGamma, Cauchy).
The Weibull, Gumbel and Frechet distributions can be represented in a single three
parameter model, known as the Generalised Extreme Value distribution (GEV):
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where: 1+ξ  x >0
The parameters µ  and σ  correspond to location and scale; the third parameter, ξ , called
the shape index, indicates the thickness of the tail of the distribution. The larger the shape
index, the thicker the tail.29
The second approach to EVT (see Reiss and Thomas, 2001, p. 23 ff) is the Peaks Over
Threshold (POT) method, tailored for the analysis of data bigger than preset high thresholds.
The severity component of the POT method is based on a distribution (Generalised
Pareto Distribution - GPD), whose cumulative function is usually expressed as the following
two parameter distribution:
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where:  x ≥  0  if  ξ  ≥  0,   0 ≤  x ≤  -σ  /ξ    if   ξ  < 0
    and  ξ  and σ   represent respectively the shape and the scale
parameter
It is possible to extend the family of the GPD distributions by adding a location
parameter µ . In this case the GPD is defined as:

































    (3)
The interpretation of ξ  in the GPD is the same as in the GEV, since all the relevant
information on the tail of the original (unknown) overall distribution is embedded in this
parameter
18: when ξ  < 0 the GPD is known as the Pareto “Type II” distribution, when ξ  = 0
the GPD corresponds to the Exponential distribution. The case when ξ  > 0 is probably the
most important for operational risk data, because the GPD takes the form of the ordinary30
Pareto distribution with tail index α  = 1/ξ  and indicates the presence of heavy-tail data 
19; in
this particular case there is a direct relationship between ξ  and the finiteness of the moments
of the distribution:
( ) ξ 1 ≥ ∞ = k if x E
k (4)
For instance, if ξ  ≥  0.5 the GPD has an infinite variance, if ξ  ≥  1 there is no finite
moment, not even the mean. This property has a direct consequence for data analysis: in fact
the (heavier or lighter) behaviour of data in the tail can be easily directly detected from the
estimate of the shape parameter.
Now, let  Fx(x) be the (unknown) distribution function of a random variable X (with
right-end point xF) which describes the behaviour of the operational risk data in a certain BL
and let Fu(y) be its excess distribution at the threshold u. The excess distribution can be
introduced as a conditional distribution function, that is:
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It represents the probability that a loss exceeds the threshold u by at most an amount y,
given that it exceeds the threshold.
The theory (Balkema-De Haan, 1974, and Pickands, 1975) maintains that for a large
class of underlying distributions, the excess distribution Fu(y) converges asymptotically to a
GPD as the threshold is progressively raised to the right endpoint xF of the distribution 
20 :
0 | ) ( ) ( | sup lim , = −
→ y GPD y Fu x u F
β ξ (6)
                                                                                                                                                                                  
18 The maxima of samples of events from GPD are GEV distributed with shape parameter equal to the shape
parameter of the parent GPD. There is a simple relationship between the standard GDP and GEV such that
GPD(x) = 1+log GEV(x) if log GEV(x) > -1
19 The ordinary Pareto is the distribution with distribution function F(x) = 1 - (a/x)
α  and support x > a. This
distribution can be rewritten as F(x) = 1 - (1 + (x - a)/a)
 α    so that it can be seen to be a GPD with shape ξ  = 1
/α , scale σ  = a/α   and location µ  = a. In practice it is a GPD where the scale parameter is constrained to be the
shape multiplied by the location, hence it is a little less flexible than a GPD, where the scale can be freely
chosen.
20 The conditions under which excess losses converge to GPD distributions are very large. For an extensive
treatment, see Embrechts et al., 1997.31

































with:  y= x-u = excess, ξ  = shape, β  = scale;
  and support   y ∈  [0,  xF - u] if ξ  ≥  0
y ∈  [0, -β /ξ ] if  ξ  < 0
In this work, the GPDξ ,β  (y) will be called the “excess GPD”, to stress the fact that the
argument y  represents the excesses, that is to say the exceedances x (i.e. the data larger than
the threshold u) minus the threshold u itself.
Equivalently, the limit condition (6) holds if the exceedances x are used in place of the
excesses y: changing the argument, the Fu(y) and GPDξ ,β  (y) transform respectively to Fu(x)
and GPDξ ,,u,β  (x), with the threshold u, now, representing the location parameter and x > u.
Therefore, when the threshold tends to the right endpoint xF, the exceedance distribution
Fu(x) converges asymptotically to a GPD with the same shape ξ , scale β  and location µ  = u.
The GPDξ ,u,β  (x) will be called the “exceedance GPD” because it deals with the exceedances
x at u.
One of the most important properties of the GPD is its stability under an increase of
the threshold.
To show that, let isolate Fx(x) from (5):
() [] () ()u F y F u F x F x u x x + − = 1 ) (
Looking at the limit condition (6), both the excess distribution Fu(y) and the
exceedance distribution Fu(x) can be approximated well by suitable GPDs. By using the
“exceedance GPD”, one obtains:32
() [] () ()u F x GPD u F x F x u x x + − ≈ β ξ , , 1 ) ( (8)
Substituting the GPDξ ,u,β  expression in (8):
() [] () u F
u x






















1 1 1 ) (
The only element now required to identify Fx(x) completely is Fx(u), that is to say the
value of the (unknown) distribution function in correspondence with the threshold u. To this
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where: n is the total number of observations
   nu the number of observations above the threshold u
The threshold u should be set at a level that let enough observations exceeding u to
obtain a reliable empirical estimate of  Fx(u).
Consequently, Fx(x) can be completely expressed by the parameters of the GPDξ ,u,σ (x)

































































This quantity is defined as the “tail estimator” of Fx(x), as it is valid only for x > u. It is
possible to demonstrate that the “tail estimator” is also GPD distributed: it is the
semiparametric representation of the GPDξ ,µ ,σ   referred to all the original data, with the same33
shape ξ  and location and scale equal to µ  and σ   respectively. The GPDξ ,µ ,σ   will be called
the “full GPD” because it is fitted to all the data in the tail area
21.







































As there is a one-to-one relationship between the “full GPD” (GPDξ ,µ ,σ ) and the
“exceedance GPD” (GPDξ ,u,β ), it is also possible to express the scale parameter of the latter
by the former: β  = σ  +ξ (u-µ ). It should be noted that, while the scale (β) of the “exceedance
GPD” depends on where the threshold is located, the shape (ξ), the location (µ ) and scale (σ )
of the “full GPD” are independent of the threshold. Hence a nice practical method to check
the robustness of the model for some specific data is to evaluate the degree of stability of
these latter parameters over a variety of thresholds 
22.
By applying the GPD stability property, it is possible to move easily from the excess
data (y = x-u) to the tail of the original data (x > u) and from the excess distribution Fu(y) to
the underlying (unknown) distribution Fx(x).
An immediate consequence of the GPD stability is that if the exceedances of a
threshold u follow a GPDξ ,u,β , the exceedances over a higher threshold v > u are
GPDξ ,v,β  +  ξ  ( v-u),  that is they are also GPD distributed with the same shape ξ , the location
equal to v (the new threshold) and the scale equal to  β  + ξ   (v-u) .  This property will be
extensively adopted in the current exercise.
                                                          
21 Examining (10) it can be immediately seen that, in contrast with the “excess GPD” (and the “exceedance
GPD”), the “full GPD” in its semiparametric representation provides information on the frequency with which
the threshold u is pierced by the exceedances: the empirical quantity Fn(u), built on the number of observations
(total and above the threshold) takes care of this aspect. Nevertheless, if one wants to move on from the
semiparametric “full GPD” to its completely parametric form, all the information on the original data must be
available (that is, it is necessary to know the amounts of the data under the threshold, in addition to their
number).34
6.  Peaks Over Threshold approach: Business Lines tail-severity estimate
In light of the EVT features described in the previous Section, the POT method is
implemented in each BL data set, by fitting the “excess GPD”, GPDξ ,β  (y), to the excess
losses of a selected threshold.
As seen before, the GPD fitting work depends on three elements:
a)  the threshold (u), to be set by the analyst;
b)  the excess data, i.e. the original data minus the selected threshold and
c)  two parameters (ξ  and β ) to be estimated from the excess data.
A key modeling aspect with the GPD is the selection of the threshold, that is the point
where the tail starts. The choice of u should be large enough to satisfy the limit law
condition (theoretical condition: u should tend to the right-end point xF), while at the same
time leaving sufficient observations for the estimation (practical condition). Furthermore,
any inference conclusion on the shape parameter – which, as noted, governs the heaviness of
the tail – should be insensitive to increases in the threshold above this suitable level.
A number of diagnostic instruments have been proposed in the literature for threshold
selection, including a bootstrap method that produces an optimal value under certain criteria
(see Danielsson et al., 2000). Owing to its handiness and simplicity, one of the most used
techniques is the mean excess plot (see Davison and Smith, 1990), a graphical tool based on



















                                                                                                                                                                                  
22 In practice, for each threshold u, the estimate of the “exceedance GPD” parameters (ξ and β) must be
obtained and hence the corresponding values of the “full GPD” parameters (µ and σ) gained. Then the
approximate equality of ξ, µ and σ for increasing thresholds must be investigated.35
i.e. the  sum of the excesses over the threshold u divided by the number of data points that
exceed the threshold itself. The SMEF is an estimate of the Mean Excess Function (MEF),
defined as:
() ( )u X u X E u MEF > − = | (13)
which describes the expected overshoot of a threshold once an exceedance occurs.
It can be demonstrated (see Embrechts et al., 1997) that if the plot shows a downward
trend (negative slope), this is a sign of short-tailed data. Exponentially distributed data would
give an approximately horizontal line while data from a heavy-tail distribution would show
an upward trend (positive slope). In particular, if the plot is a positively sloped straight line
above a certain threshold u, it is an indication that the data follow a GPD with a positive











where (β  + ξ  u) > 0
In applying the mean excess plot to the eight BLs, the goal is to detect a straightening
out or, at least, a change in the slope of the plot above a certain threshold, in order to be able
to fix that threshold as the start of the tail and to fit the GPD to the excess data. For each data
set, the SMEF against increasing thresholds from the initial value is plotted; since the plot
can be hard to interpret for very large thresholds (because there are few  exceedances and,
hence, high variability in the sample mean), it was decided to end the plot at the fourth order
statistic (see Figure 6) 
23.
                                                          
23 One issue of the mean excess plot is that the MEF does not exist for GPD with ξ   > 1.  In that case, a
trimmed version of the MEF could be used, since the last function always exists, regardless of the shape values
(on this topic see Reiss and Thomas, 2001, p. 56).
In the current exercise, a comparison between the SMEF and its trimmed version (applying a data truncation
percentage of 5 per cent from below and from above) was made. As the differences in the resulting plots were
negligibles, the whole, untrimmed, version of the SMEF was adopted for the selection of the threshold.36
Figure 6: mean excess plot for the BLs
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In all the data sets, clear evidence of straightening out of the plot is found from the
starting level. However, owing to the need to satisfy the theoretical condition (u should be
large enough), the threshold is set close to the 90
th empirical percentile for all the BLs except
for Retail Banking, where it is shifted to the 96.5
th percentile because of the greater number
of observations.
In Table 4 the threshold selection results are reported for all the BLs.
Table 4: BLs threshold selection
The set thresholds leave a large enough number of exceedances to apply statistical
inference in all the BLs 
24, except for BL1.
                                                          
24 This affirmation is supported by the results of a simulation study conducted by McNeil and Saladin, 1997,
aimed to detect the minimal number of data and exceedances to work with in order to obtain reliable estimates
of high quantiles of given distributions. In particular, the exercise showed that, when the data presented a
Pareto heavy tail with shape parameter α  =1/ξ  = 1, a minimum number of 1,000 (2,000) data and 100 (200)
exceedances was required to have a reliable GPD estimate of the 99
th (99.9
th) percentile. As it can be seen in
Table 4, apart from BL1, the number of excesses appears to be large enough to obtain reliable estimates of the
99.9
th percentile for the majority of the BLs.





BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 423 400.28 89.85% 42
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 5,132 193.00 89.85% 512
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 28,882 247.00 96.50% 1,000
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  3,414 270.00 90.66% 315
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 1,852 110.00 89.85% 187
BL 6  (Agency Services) 1,490 201.66 89.20% 158
BL 7  (Asset Management) 1,109 235.00 90.00% 107
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 3,267 149.51 89.99% 32638
For each BL, the maximum likelihood method is adopted to estimate the shape and
scale parameters of the GPD. For ξ  > -0.5, Hosking and Wallis, 1987, present evidence that
maximum likelihood regularity conditions are fulfilled (consistency and asymptotic
efficiency) and the maximum likelihood estimates are asymptotically normally distributed 
25.
As regards the BL1, a Bayesian correction of the (prior) maximum likelihood estimates is
conducted to obtain more consistent values for the parameters of the GPD 
26.
To reinforce the judgements on the shapes estimate, a shape plot, based on the
comparison of the ξ  estimates across a variety of thresholds, is used (see Embrecths et al.,
1997, p. 339). In practice, different GPD models are fitted to the excesses, with thresholds
increasing from the starting limit (see Table 4) to the values located approximately at the
99.9
th empirical percentile. The degree of stability of ξ  is then evaluated in the, right to
medium-left, range of the estimates interval: if the ξ  values do not vary somewhat, the
inference is not too sensitive to the choice of the threshold in that range and a final estimate
of the shape parameter can be obtained as an average value of the ξ  estimates 
27.
Figure 7 shows, for some BLs (BL3, BL5, BL7 and BL8) the number of exceedances
identified for the corresponding thresholds (horizontal axis) and the estimates of the shape
parameter (vertical axis).
                                                          
25 The main competitors of the maximum likelihood estimator in the GPD model are the methods of moments
(simple matching and probability weighted) and, limited to ξ, the Hill estimator. However, the moments
methods assume the existence of the second moment, hence they perform poorly when the second moment
does not exist (that is when ξ > 0.5), while the Hill estimator may be inaccurate if the shape parameter ξ
estimate is large.
26 If there are few data (less than 40, say) the estimation errors become very large and resort has to be made to
credibility or Bayesian methods. For the application of Bayesian methods, see for example Smith and
Goodman,1996, Medova, 2000, and Reiss and Thomas, 2001.
27 To evaluate the finite sample properties of the maximum likelihood estimator (i.e. sensitivity to threshold
and sample size) McNeil and Frey, 2000, and Nystrom and Skoglund, 2002, conducted MonteCarlo
experiments for various distributions and sample sizes. The results were encouraging in all the cases, because39
 Figure 7: Shape plot for some BLs
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the estimator hardly varied with the choice of threshold within reasonable limits of the number of excesses (5-
13 per cent of the whole data set).40
In each BL plot, a satisfactory stability of ξ  can be found in the range from the starting
threshold (right-side of the plot) to high thresholds (medium-left side of the plot) 
28. In light
of that, each BL shape finale figure is set as the median of the ξ  values in that range, pending
confirmation of the estimate in a while by suitable tests. The final value for the scale
parameter β  is the maximum likelihood estimate calculated at the starting threshold.
Table 5 reports, for each BL, the GPD shape and scale estimates, together with the
values of the K-S and A-D tests. For the shape parameters, confidence intervals at the
significance level of α  = 95 per cent are also computed using a bootstrap procedure.
Table 5: GPD fitting results
It can be observed that:
•   the K-S test values are lower than the critical ones in all the BLs, while the A-D test
values show a slight rejection of the null hypothesis for BL3 and BL6 (at the significance
level of α =90 per cent) and BL4 (even at the higher significance level of α =99 per cent).
Even if, in general, the hypothesis BLs tail originates from a GPD seems reasonable, the
                                                          
28 In the above plots, the stability is evident, for BL3, from a number of exceedances equal to 1,000 (in
corrispondence with the starting threshold) to about 100; for BL5, from 187 to about 70; for BL7, from 107 to
about 40; for BL8, from 326 to about 100.
Fitting tests results
Anderson- Darling 
BUSINESS LINE n. 
excesses
βξlower limit upper limit test results
critical values 
(α  = 90°)
test results
critical values 
(α  = 90°)
critical values 
(α  = 99°)
BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 42 774 1.19 1.06 1.58 0.099 0.189 0.486 0.630 1.030
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 512 254 1.17 0.98 1.35 0.027 0.054 0.508 0.630 1.030
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 1,000 233 1.01 0.88 1.14 0.020 0.023 0.675 0.630 1.030
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  315 412 1.39 1.20 1.62 0.058 0.070 1.541 0.630 1.030
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 187 107 1.23 0.96 1.37 0.028 0.090 0.247 0.630 1.030
BL 6  (Agency Services) 158 243 1.22 1.03 1.42 0.064 0.097 0.892 0.630 1.030
BL 7  (Asset Management) 107 314 0.85 0.57 1.18 0.060 0.118 0.217 0.630 1.030




ξ confidence interval 
(α =95°)41
accuracy of the model needs to be confirmed by the outcomes of testing procedures, which
are more appropriate for large losses. This exercise will be conducted in the next section;
•   the shape parameters estimate (ξ ) confirms the previous bootstrapping results (see Section
3) as regards the high kurtosis of the loss data for the BLs. Owing to the ξ estimates, the
GPD models have infinite variance in all the BLs (the ξ  values are always greater than 0.5)
and, furthermore, have infinite mean in six BLs (ξ  > 1 in BL1, BL2, BL3, BL4, BL5, BL6)
and almost infinite mean in BL8 (ξ  = 0.98);
•   although there is some uncertainty in each shape estimate, reflected in the extent of its
confidence interval, the range of the ξ  values provides evidence of the different riskiness of
the BLs. This impression will be confirmed in Section 8 by directly exploring and measuring
the tail of the BLs.
Figure 8 below shows, for each BL, the GPD curve together with the empirical
distribution function; the graphical analysis is limited to the last 50 per cent of the data or to
the tails. Unlike the conventional inference, closeness of the GPD and the empirical
distribution is now found even at the highest percentiles.
  
 Figure 8: All the BLs. Generalised Pareto Distribution fit
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7.  Advanced tests on the severity results
As seen in the previous Section, the K-S and A-D tests provide some evidence of the
closeness of the GPD to the data. However, these tests are usually employed in actuarial
applications to measure the goodness of distributions fitted to a data set as a whole, not being
tailored for distributions of excesses over some thresholds. A specific, more tailored, test for




















where u is the threshold and σ  and µ  are the parameters of the “full GPD”.
If the excesses (xi-u) are i.i.d. from a GPDξ ,µ ,σ , the residuals Wi should be i.i.d.
Exponentially distributed with mean γ  =1. As a result, two types of plots can be used to show
whether these assumptions are in fact supported by the data:
•   a scatter plot of residuals against their (time) order of occurrences. Systematic variation of
the residuals with time would indicate the presence of a trend in the model. Consequently,
the assumption of data stationarity may not be correct, given that the losses become smaller
or larger on average as time evolves;
•   a Q-Q plot of residuals against the expected order statistics under the Exponential
distribution. If the plot stays close to a straight line, the Exponential assumption for the
residuals and hence the GPD assumption for the excesses, may be tenable.
In light of the pooling exercise performed in this exercise, only the latter assumption
(the GPD behaviour of the excesses) may be tested. Nevertheless, as stated in Section 3, the
short temporal window on which the losses were collected provides a significant guarantee
for the absence of a trend in the data gathered in each individual bank’s database.44
After obtaining the residuals Wi 
29, the Q-Q plots are plotted (in Figure 9, the plots for
the BLs not, graphically, addressed in the previous shape plots analysis are shown). The Q-Q
plots appear to be quite close to a straight line of unit slope, hence, indicating an acceptable
fit of the GPD to the excesses.
Figure 9: Q-Q plot of residuals Wi  for some BLs
                                                          
29 In order to obtain the residuals Wi, the “full GPD” parameters µ and σ are needed. To this end,
semiparametric estimates are derived by substituting in (11) the estimates of the “exceedance GPD” parameters
(ξ  and β ), in addition to the threshold value and the number of observations (total and over the threshold).
BL1 (Corporate Finance).
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In order to check in a more accurately way the GPD assumption for all the BLs, the
Exponential hypothesis for residuals Wi is analytically tested within the Generalised Pareto
model (H0 : ξ  = 0 
30 against H1: ξ  ≠  0) by a suitable Likelihood Ratio test.








≤ ≤ n i
i i
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LR W GPD W GPD T ) ( log 2 , , 0 , , σ µ σ µ ξ (16)
Since the parameter sets have dimension 3 and 2, the TLR-test is asymptotically
distributed as a χ
2 with 1 degree of freedom under the null hypothesis. Consequently, the p-
value is:
() LR LR T p
2
1 1 χ − =
For each BL, the TLR statistic is applied to the Wi residuals and the corresponding p-
value derived (see Table 6).
Table 6: Test of residuals Wi  for the GPD model: mean estimate (γγγγ ) and p-value
The results confirm the hypothesis that the GPD is an appropriate model to represent,
even at high confidence levels, the tail of all the BLs.
                                                          
30 For ξ   close to 0, the GPD tends to an Exponential distribution (see Section 5).
BUSINESS LINE γ   estimate p-value of TLR
BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 1.001 0.81
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 1.001 0.18
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 0.999 0.52
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  1.070 0.29
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 1.002 0.74
BL 6  (Agency Services) 0.960 0.77
BL 7  (Asset Management) 0.900 0.52
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 1.003 0.9246
In the last part of this Section, a severity Value at Risk (VaRSev) performance analysis
is carried out for each BL in order to compare the different levels of accuracy of the GPD
and the conventional Gumbel and LogNormal distributions in representing the highest
percentiles of data.
The relative VaRSev performance of each model (see the next section for the GPDVaR
calculation) is backtested by comparing the estimated and the expected number of violations:
a violation occurs when the actual loss exceeds the VaRSev value. A number of violations
higher than the expected one indicates that the model consistently underestimates the risk at
the tail 
31.
In practice, the expected number of violations in each BL is obtained by comparing the
total number of observations with the desired percentile. For instance, if a BL contains 1,000
data overall, the expected number of violations at the 99
th percentile is equal to 0.01 * 1,000
= 10. Therefore, if the parametric model were correct, one would expect only 10
observations to be greater than the 99
th percentile singled out by the model. If the violations
are more than 10, the 99
th  parametric percentile lies at a lower level and hence
underestimates the actual tail of data.






th percentiles are compared with the estimated one, drawn from, respectively, the
GPD, LogNormal and Gumbel distributions.
                                                          
31  This test is equivalent to that  usually adopted in market risk to evaluate the VaR sensitivity of  the model.47
Table 7: VaRSev performance analysis
It can immediately be seen that, while the number of violations for the GPD model are






th) percentiles – the LogNormal and Gumbel numbers of violations are
N. VIOLATIONS
Percentile Theoretical GPD  LogNormal Gumbel
0.950 21.15 21 36 16
0.975 10.58 12 22 15
0.990 4.23 3 16 13
n. obs =  0.995 2.12 2 13 12
423 0.999 0.42 0 5 10
0.950 256.60 259 351 211
0.975 128.30 129 261 184
0.990 51.32 56 185 160
n. obs =  0.995 25.66 26 144 137
5,132 0.999 5.13 2 89 113
0.950 1,444.10 1,386 2,062 1,234
0.975 722.05 722 1,551 1,023
0.990 288.82 294 1,094 812
n. obs =  0.995 144.41 139 837 719
28,882 0.999 28.88 31 514 560
0.950 170.70 173 241 168
0.975 85.35 102 175 155
0.990 34.14 48 137 137
n. obs =  0.995 17.07 20 106 130
3,414 0.999 3.41 5 71 106
0.950 92.60 95 115 60
0.975 46.30 44 89 49
0.990 18.52 20 58 43
n. obs =  0.995 9.26 10 46 42
1,852 0.999 1.85 2 33 34
0.950 74.50 73 98 66
0.975 37.25 41 73 58
0.990 14.90 16 51 50
n. obs =  0.995 7.45 7 41 46
1,490 0.999 1.49 0 30 39
0.950 55.45 55 72 55
0.975 27.73 32 53 48
0.990 11.09 9 38 40
n. obs =  0.995 5.55 6 27 38
1,109 0.999 1.11 1 10 30
0.950 163.35 166 220 134
0.975 81.68 88 149 117
0.990 32.67 30 105 99
n. obs =  0.995 16.34 16 73 87
3,267 0.999 3.27 6 37 58
BL 5     
(Payment & 
Settlement)
BL 6       
(Agency 
Services)
BL 7         
(Asset 
Management)
BL 8          
(Retail 
Brokerage)
BL 1  
(Corporate 
Finance)
BL 2      
(Trading & 
Sales)
BL 3         
(Retail    
Banking)
BL 4  
(Commercial 
Banking) 48
always larger than the expected ones. This outcome once again confirms the excess of
optimism of the conventional inference in representing the operational riskiness of the BLs.
8. Business Lines tail-severity measures and magnitude
The results from the graphical inspection, the goodness-of-fit tests and the VaRSev
performance analysis clearly indicate that the GPD appears to be a consistent and accurate
model to with which represent the extreme quantiles of each BL's operational risk data set.
In light of that, in this section the GPD will be used to get information on the size of the tail
of the eight BLs, that is on their operational severity riskiness.
The first risk measure that is computed is the VaR introduced in the previous Section
for backtesting purposes (GPDVaR). In standard statistical language, the VaR at confidence
level p is the smallest loss that is greater than the p
th  percentile of the underlying loss
distribution:
() {} p X F x X VaR x p ≥ = : inf ) ( (17)
As the GPD only deals with the severity component of the losses and does not address
the matter of the frequency of their occurrence, the GPDVaR identifies merely the time-
unconditional loss percentile. In this exercise, the conditional losses referred to a 1-year time
horizon (and hence the conditional 1-year loss percentiles) will be computed after
completely implementing the POT approach in order to take into account its frequency
component (see Sections 9 and 10).
In the GPD model, it is possible to obtain a formula for the VaR by the semiparametric
representation of the “full GPD”.
In fact, for a given confidence level p > Fx(u), the VaR expression can be obtained by




































th), computed on the basis of the estimates of ξ   and β  gained in the previous Section.
Table 8: BLs GPDVaR  (Euro ,000)
By looking at Table 8,  one can get the desired information on the size of the tail of the
BLs, on the basis of the figure revealed by the GPDVaR at the various percentiles.
However it should be observed that one of the most serious problems in using the VaR
in practical applications is that, when losses do not have a like-Normal behaviour, the VaR is
unstable and difficult to work with and, further, it fails to be a coherent measure of risk (in
the sense introduced by Arztner et al. in a well-known article in 1999)
32. Moreover, the VaR
provides no handle on the extent of the losses that might be suffered beyond the amount
indicated by the VaR measure itself. It merely gives a lowest bound for the losses in the tail
and, in doing so, has a bias toward optimism instead of conservatism in the measure of the
riskiness of the businesses.
                                                          
32 The concept of “coherent” measures of risk was introduced in a famous article by Artzner et al, 1999, in
which the authors identified the specific properties a measure of risk had to respect in order to be classified as
coherent. Except for elliptical distributions, VaR was proved not to satisfy the property of subadditivity and
hence not to take into consideration the principle of risk diversification. Despite that, VaR was proved to
satisfy the other axioms: monotonicity, positive homogeneity and translation invariance.
BUSINESS LINE p = 95° p = 99° p = 99.9°
BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 1,222 9,743 154,523
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 463 3,178 47,341
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 176 826 8,356
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  668 6,479 159,671
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 230 1,518 25,412
BL 6  (Agency Services) 501 3,553 58,930
BL 7  (Asset Management) 511 2,402 17,825
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 272 1,229 11,53950
In light of that and given the actual characteristics of the 2002 LDCE operational risk
losses –a high level of kurtosis and a distributional behaviour very far from the Normal one -
different measures of risk are called for in order to have a consistent and reliable view of the
actual riskiness of the eight BLs. Quantities which estimate the shortfall risk appear to be the
proper tool, since they provide information on the magnitude of the whole tail and,
moreover, they were proved to be coherent measures of risk (see the abovementioned article
by Artzner et al.).
The most popular of these measures is the Expected Shortfall (ES), which estimates
the potential size of the loss exceeding a selected level L of the distribution (the level L may
be associated, for example, to a preset threshold u or to the VaRp itself). The expression for
the ES is:
() ( ) () L MEF L L X L X E L L ES + = > − + = | (19)
where the second term in the formula is simply the Mean Excess Function (13),
introduced in Section 6.
In the GPD model with threshold u and parameters ξ  and β , the expression for the ES
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which is defined only for values of the shape ξ  < 1.
In light of the BLs shape estimate obtained in the current exercise (greater than 1 or
very close to 1, see Table 5), it is evident that the GPDES cannot be consistently used.
Accordingly, alternative measures of shortfall risk are called for.
                                                          
33 Given the POT stability propriety, the conditional distribution over the level L, FL(y) = P(X-L≤y|X>L), is
also GPD with the same ξ , location = L and scale = β  + ξ  (L-u). The expected value of FL(y) is the MEF(L) and
assumes the form [β  + ξ (L-u)]/(1-ξ ). Substituing in (19), it is possible to calculate the expression for the
GPDES(L), in both the cases of     L = u and L =VaRp.51
A solution lies in a quantity which resorts to the Median Excess Function [MEDEF
(u)], that is to the median of excesses over a threshold u: MEDEF (u) = [Fu(1/2)]
 -1.
In particular, the MEDEF(u) for the GPD model can be derived, firstly, by inverting
the expression (7) −  that is the “excess GPD” at u, GPDξ ,β (y) −  for a generic probability p, to
get:
[] () [] 1 1 ) (
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and then imposing  p = 1/2





Making use of the GPDMEDEF(u), an appropriate measure of shortfall risk, strictly
connected to the GPDES(u), can be easily derived. The expression is:




u u GPD u u GPD MEDEF MS (21)
which may be identified as the (GPD) Median Shortfall at level u.
The nice feature of the GPDMS(u) is that, unlike the GPDES, it is defined regardless of
the values of the shape (see Reiss and Thomas, 2001, p. 56), while preserving, similarly to
the GPDES, the property of the POT stability (see Rootzen and Tajvidi, 1997). In particular,
given the quantity GPDMS(u) computed at the threshold u, the GPDMS(v) at the higher level
v > u can be expressed as:





ξ β u v
v v GPDMS (22)
In light of its features, the GPDMS represents the suitable and reliable risk measure
used in this exercise to compute the  tail-severity riskiness of the eight BLs.
In Table 9, for each BL, the GPDMS values computed at the starting threshold u −  as
previously noted, close to the 90
th empirical percentile for all the BLs except for BL3 (96.5
th)




Table 9: BLs tail-severity magnitude (Euro ,000)
(*) As the starting threshold for Retail Banking is close to the 96.5
th percentile, the GPDMS is constant under this level.
(**) As the GPDMS expression (22) makes use of the thresholds v and u as non-parametric components, it is not directly
comparable with the GPDVaR (18), whose non-parametric components are represented, other than the threshold u itself,
by the number (n) of total observations and the number (nu) of exceedances with respect to the threshold u. It follows
that at some percentiles, the GPDMS figure may be lower than the GPDVaR (in the current exercise, this is the case for
Commercial Banking and Agency Services at the percentile of 99.9
th).
Table 9 clearly indicates that:
•   owing to the tail heaviness of the data, each BL's severity riskiness increases remarkably
at the highest percentiles. On average over the eight BLs, the ratio between the 99.9
th and the
99
th  percentiles is about 10, with a peak of about 20 in BL5 (Payment & Settlement) and
BL7 (Asset Management);
•   the ranking of the riskiness of the BLs does not change significantly as the threshold is
progressively raised up to the 99.9
th percentile. In particular Corporate Finance and
Commercial Banking are found to be the riskiest BLs with an estimated 99.9
th percentile of
severity loss of € 260 million and € 151 million, respectively. On the other hand, Retail
Banking and Retail Brokerage prove to be the least risky BLs, showing a 99.9
th severity loss
of € 17 million and € 27 million, respectively.
BUSINESS LINE 90° 91° 92° 93° 94° 95° 96° 97° 98° 99° 99.5° 99.9°
BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 1,234 1,383 1,740 1,861 2,245 3,383 4,256 7,311 11,927 19,030 111,577 260,415
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 464 535 599 705 878 1,121 1,436 2,180 3,493 7,998 17,824 70,612
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 
(*) 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 550 831 1,694 3,232 17,411
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)
 (**) 750 764 896 1,070 1,322 1,694 2,776 4,490 8,453 20,063 39,246 151,553
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 227 262 302 342 415 551 697 914 1,714 3,910 9,950 80,518
BL 6  (Agency Services) 
(**) 466 579 661 779 950 1,208 1,669 2,619 5,324 10,107 22,636 51,805
BL 7  (Asset Management) 531 580 656 716 887 1,076 1,431 1,972 2,457 4,264 13,630 79,423
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 273 295 329 376 427 520 643 909 1,200 2,222 4,954 27,628
TOTAL  4,428 4,879 5,664 6,331 7,604 10,034 13,390 20,946 35,400 69,287 223,050 739,36453
9.  Peaks Over Threshold approach: Business Lines tail-frequency estimate
The exercises carried out in the previous Sections focused on the estimate and the
measurement of the (tail) severity component of the distribution of losses. As noted, the
severity figure provides information only on the potential size of the losses that a (large
internationally active) bank can bear, regardless of the holding period in which the losses
occur. In practice such as unconditional figure does not take into consideration the frequency
of the losses incurred in a given time horizon and therefore it is not yet adequate to represent
the BLs capital charge.
In fact, supposing that the operational risk capital charge should be determined for 1-
year holding period at the 99
th percentile, if the final estimate were based only on the
unconditional GPDMS(99
th) amount, this figure would underestimate or overestimate the
actual risk, depending on whether the probability of a 1-year occurrence of the losses with a
single-impact magnitude bigger than the 99
th percentile of the severity distribution is
respectively higher or lower than 1 per cent.
The purpose of this Section is thus to supplement the GPD analysis carried out in the
previous Sections, by estimating and measuring the frequency of the large losses for each
BL.
To achieve this, the POT approach, so far limited to its severity component (POT-
GPD), is now totally implemented by means of the Point Process representation of the
exceedances (POT-PP).
The basic assumption of this method - developed as a probabilistic technique by
Leadbetter et al., 1983, and Resnick, 1987, and as a statistical tool by Smith, 1989 - is to
view the number of exceedances and the excesses as a marked point process with a proper
intensity, that, in its basic representation, converges to a two-dimensional Poisson process.
In practice:54
a)  the exceedances (x) over a threshold u occur at the times of a Poisson process with
intensity λ;
b)  the corresponding excesses (y=x-u) are independent and have a GPD distribution;
c)  the number of exceedances and the excesses are independent of each other.
The parameter λ  measures the intensity of the exceedances at u per unit of time, that is
if the number of large losses is stable over time or if it becomes more or less frequent.
In the basic case of stationarity of the process 
34, the number of exceedances occurs as













where ξ, µ and σ, as usual, represent the shape, the location and the scale parameters of
the “full GPD” and λ u is supplied with the subscript to stress the dependence on the
threshold u (it is assumed in fact that this expression is valid only for x  ≥ u).
Since λ u should be measured in the same time units as used for the collection of the
data, an estimate of the time-adjusted number of exceedances in a certain period T can be
simply obtained by λ u T. For instance, if the per-bank number of exceedances in a 1-year
period is to be determined and the data collection refers indistinctly to working days and
holidays, the annualised intensity of exceedance will be:
u year N λ 365 1 = −     (24)
                                                          
34 It should be noted, however, that the Point Process is robust against the non stationarity of data. In fact if
evidence of time-dependence of large losses is detected, some, or all, the parameters can be a function of time
and, in that case, the model would be a non-homogeneus Poisson process (for example, if the intensity rate was
not constant over time, a smoothing of λ =λ (t) over t may be appropriate). Furthermore, specific techniques
exist to handle other kinds of dependence of data, such as clustering of excesses. The only assumption that has
to be preserved to guarantee the robustness of the model is that the distribution of excesses is approximated by
a GPD. For examples of the application of the POT method in presence of trends of exceedances, see the case
studies of “tropospheric ozone” and “wind-storm claims”, carried out respectively by Smith and Shively, 1995,
and Rootzen and Tajvidi, 1997. For a smoothing technique to incorporate trends in the model, see Chavez-
Demoulin and Embrechts, 2003. For declustering methods, see Smith, 1989, Rootzen et al., 1992, and Ferro
and Segers, 2003.55
Equation (24) is tailored to the operational risk data, since the time of occurrence of a
single operational loss (either small or large) does not appear to be dependent on the working
days 
35.
One of the nicest properties of the POT-PP, similarly to the POT-GPD, is its stability
under an increase of the threshold: if a Point Process at the threshold u converges to a
Poisson process with intensity λ u, the Point Process at level v > u also converges to a Poisson











u v 1 (25)
where β  is the scale parameter of the “exceedance GPD” GPDξ ,u,β  (see Rootzen and
Tajvidi, 1997). The same relationship holds if the intensity for unit of time λ u is substituted
by a certain time-adjusted intensity, which, as noted, identifies the mean number of
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where NT,. represents the per-bank mean number of exceedances (at v or at u) in a
period of length T.
By expression (25) or (26), it is thus possible to analytically derive frequency figures
for large losses in correspondence with higher thresholds than the initial level.
In order to employ the POT-PP approach in the current exercise, an estimate of NT,u in
each BL at the starting threshold u is needed; subsequently the (26) may be used to get the
mean number of exceedances NT,v at higher thresholds v. The holding period is, obviously,
the time window employed in the 2002 LDCE, i.e. 1-year.
In general, an empirical estimate of the average annualised number of exceedances
(N1-year,u) occurred in a bank can simply be obtained from the total number of exceedances
occurred over the years of the data collection divided by the number of years itself.
                                                          
35 Operational loss events such as business disruption, fraud, external events, etc. may occur either on working
days or on holidays. On the contrary, the annualised intensity for financial losses tends to be connected to the
actual trading days, i.e. N1-year = 250 λ u.56
Therefore, if the observations pooled in each BL data set were referred to only one bank, N1-
year,u would have been merely the count of exceedances over the threshold identified in the
GPD analysis (see the last column of Table 4).
However, it is to remind that each BL data set is the result of pooling the observations
of a, distinct, number n of banks (see Table 1) and, as stated in Section 2, it can reasonably
be assumed equivalent to the collection of i.i.d. losses from a medium-sized LDCE bank
during a time window of n-years. In light of that, a consequent, easy, way to identify an
empirical average annualised intensity Nu
i  pertaining to the i-th BL (omitting the 1-year
notation for simplicity) is the ratio between the total number of exceedances that occurred in
that BL and the number of banks providing data to the i-th BL itself (column 5 of Table 4
divided by column 2 of Table 1).
Nevertheless, a per-bank analysis of the actual number of exceedances at the GPD
starting threshold occurring in each BL reveals that this number is rather widespread over
the panel of banks: on average across the BLs, it results equal to 0 in 30 per cent of the cases
(to say, no exceedances occur) and assumes values much larger than the mean in other, not
negligible, cases. The reasons for this may lie in the different levels of comprehensiveness in
the collection of (large) losses among the banks participating in the RMG survey and,
perhaps, also in the short time horizon of the 2002 LDCE (1-year data collection), which
might have caused, for some banks, a few gaps in the collection of very rare and large losses,
especially if driven by banks’ external sources (see footnote 8). Another likely cause of the
variability of the frequency of large losses across the panel may lie in the actual presence of
banks having different size and hence potentially in a position to produce, in some BLs, a
lower or higher number of large losses in a given time horizon 
36.
These frequency issues are specifically addressed and mitigated in this Section in order
to reduce the threat of obtaining biased estimates of the BLs frequency of large losses and
hence of the capital figures.
                                                          
36 Although it is realistic to assume that banks having similar characteristics are not distinguishable by the
severity of the losses (see Section 2, in particular footnote 8), the repetitiveness of losses, both small and large,
appears to be actually linked to the volume of business carried out, that is to the size of the bank. A “frequence
scaling methodology” is therefore called for.57
In particular, to explicitly take into account the potential differences in banks’ size –
which, as noted, may affect the frequency of large losses – it is assumed the existence in the
2002 LDCE of two distinct groups of banks: a “lower group”, consisting of banks with
smaller size (in fact domestic banks), and an “upper group”, consisting of banks with larger
size (in fact internationally active banks). For both a typical domestic bank and a typical
international active bank, suitable estimates of the annualised intensity of exceedances are
gained.
In order to get such estimates, in each BL the number of per-bank exceedances is fitted
by a Poisson and Binomial Negative model. Owing to the high skewness to the right, the
Binomial Negative distributions result the best-fitting ones in all the datasets: accordingly, in
each BL, the “mean” and the “mean plus two standard deviations” of that distribution are
assumed to be respectively the average annualised intensity of exceedances for a typical
domestic bank (N
low) and the average annualised intensity of exceedances for a typical
international active bank (N
high).
Table 10 shows, for each BL, the number of banks providing data and the number of
banks with at least one exceedance over the relevant GPD threshold, as well the parameters
estimate of the Binomial Negative distribution (r and p). On the basis of such estimates, the
mean number of exceedances at u for typical domestic and international active banks are
computed (the last two columns of the Table).
Table 10: BLs average annualised frequency of large losses at the initial threshold
BUSINESS LINE
n. banks providing 
data





BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 33 15 0.45 0.25 1.30 5.83
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 67 48 0.37 0.05 7.78 33.92
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 80 66 0.26 0.02 12.36 61.75
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  73 54 0.47 0.10 4.36 17.68
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 55 36 0.51 0.13 3.42 13.66
BL 6  (Agency Services) 40 23 0.30 0.07 3.97 19.10
BL 7  (Asset Management) 52 29 0.52 0.20 2.08 8.53





After computing the average annualised frequency of large losses at the threshold u,
the figure for the mean number of exceedances at higher thresholds (set in correspondence
with the same significant empirical percentiles as those of the GPDMS; see Table 9) may be
derived from (26). In Table 11, the BLs tail-frequency magnitudes for typical international
active and domestic banks are reported.
Table 11: BLs tail-frequency magnitude
Typical international active bank : N
high
Typical domestic bank: N
low
(*) As the starting threshold for Retail Banking is close to the 96.5
th  percentile, N is constant below this level.
BUSINESS LINE 90° 91° 92° 93° 94° 95° 96° 97° 98° 99° 99.5° 99.9°
BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 5.83 5.38 4.55 4.33 3.77 2.75 2.29 1.48 0.99 0.68 0.15 0.08
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 33.92 30.24 27.53 24.08 20.08 16.37 13.30 9.36 6.28 3.10 1.57 0.48
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 
(*) 61.75 61.75 61.75 61.75 61.75 61.75 61.75 53.88 35.45 17.37 9.14 1.73
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  17.68 17.47 15.63 13.80 11.89 9.98 7.02 4.98 3.17 1.70 1.05 0.40
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 13.66 12.00 10.59 9.49 8.04 6.31 5.17 4.12 2.45 1.24 0.58 0.11
BL 6  (Agency Services)  19.10 15.98 14.34 12.52 10.64 8.73 6.70 4.63 2.59 1.53 0.79 0.40
BL 7  (Asset Management) 8.53 7.85 6.97 6.40 5.16 4.22 3.12 2.20 1.72 0.92 0.24 0.03
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 41.16 37.69 33.48 28.90 25.17 20.39 16.27 11.30 8.46 4.47 1.96 0.34
TOTAL  202 188 175 161 146 130 116 92 61 31 15 4
BUSINESS LINE 90° 91° 92° 93° 94° 95° 96° 97° 98° 99° 99.5° 99.9°
BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 1.30 1.20 1.02 0.97 0.84 0.61 0.51 0.33 0.22 0.15 0.03 0.02
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 7.78 6.94 6.31 5.52 4.61 3.75 3.05 2.15 1.44 0.71 0.36 0.11
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 
(*) 12.36 12.36 12.36 12.36 12.36 12.36 12.36 10.79 7.10 3.48 1.83 0.35
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  4.36 4.30 3.85 3.40 2.93 2.46 1.73 1.23 0.78 0.42 0.26 0.10
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 3.42 3.00 2.65 2.37 2.01 1.58 1.29 1.03 0.61 0.31 0.15 0.03
BL 6  (Agency Services)  3.97 3.33 2.98 2.60 2.21 1.82 1.39 0.96 0.54 0.32 0.16 0.08
BL 7  (Asset Management) 2.08 1.91 1.70 1.56 1.26 1.03 0.76 0.54 0.42 0.23 0.06 0.01
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 7.98 7.30 6.49 5.60 4.88 3.95 3.15 2.19 1.64 0.87 0.38 0.07
TOTAL  43 40 37 34 31 28 24 19 13 6 3 159
For an international active bank, the number of exceedances N
high at the starting
thresholds is 202. In correspondence with the threshold of  € 1 million 
37, the POT-PP model
reveals a total number of exceedances in the region of 60. This value is absolutely
comparable with that of large internationally active banks, which provide evidence of an
average number of losses above $1 million, ranging from 50 to 80 per year (see De
Fontnouvelle, Deleuss-Rueff, Jordan and Rosengren, 2003).
However, in both the “lower group” and the “upper group” of banks, the number of
exceedances identified by the model at the highest percentiles (99.5
th and 99.9
th) declines
remarkably, giving force to the above-mentioned hypothesis of some gaps in the collection
of the very large losses, which the pooling exercise has not been able to recover sufficiently.
In the next section, devoted to computing the capital figure of the BLs, this possible
incompleteness in the number of extreme losses will be mitigated by placing a floor on the,
1-year period, probability of occurrence of the losses with a single-impact magnitude bigger
than the GPDMS(99
th) amount: the floor will be the number of exceedances identified by the
POT-PP model just at the  99
th percentile 
38.
Finally, it should be noted that the number of exceedances across the range of
percentiles is, for a typical international active bank, up to 4-5 times that of a typical
domestic bank; as it will be shown in the next Section, this will have a significant effect on
the magnitude of the capital charge pertinent to this category of banks.
10. Business Lines capital charge
On the basis of the POT tail-frequency and tail-severity values gained in the previous
Sections, it is now possible to compute, for each BL and at any desired percentile, an
estimate of the aggregated figure, which represents the operational risk capital charge
required to cover expected plus unexpected losses in a 1-year holding period.
                                                          
37 Obviously, the threshold of  € 1 million is placed in each BL at a specific empirical percentile, which is not
necessarily identical across the BLs.
38  As it will be seen in the next Section, this assumption implies that the frequency figures used to compute the
99.5
th and the 99.9
th percentiles of the aggregated losses are stable and equal to the (higher) frequency value
identified by the POT-PP model at the 99
th percentile.60
An easy and sound way to compute such an estimate is by means of a similar measure
to that adopted in the Risk Theory for the calculation of the “excess claims net premium”,
i.e. the “average frequency of exceedances” times the “average severity of excess ” (see
Reiss and Thomas, 2001, p. 279-87). In the current exercise it is sufficient to substitute the
“average severity of excesses” with the “average severity of exceedances” (the excesses plus
the threshold) to obtain outcomes that, at any percentile of the aggregated losses, move on
from the “unexpected” to the “expected plus unexpected” side of the overall distribution.
However, before such as exercise may be performed, it is worthwhile to draw attention
to the fact that the extent of the capital figures for rising percentiles depends on the increase
of the severity of the exceedances compared with the reduction of their frequency of
occurrence. Under this perspective, the nice feature of the POT approach, in its POT-GPD
and POT-PP representations, is that it binds analytically the severity of large losses to their
frequency as the corresponding thresholds (say, percentiles) are progressively raised, thus
allowing the two components of the aggregated losses to be jointly addressed. The intensity
of exceedances, λ u, identified by (23), or even its time-adjusted figure, NT,u, is the “bridge”
which naturally connects the severity of large losses to their frequency at the initial
threshold, u, while expression (22) for the severity 
39, and equations (25) or (26) for the
frequency, constitute the tools that take care, from the starting threshold to the highest
percentiles, of both the components in a mathematical, mutually coherent, manner. So,
through a suitable combination of these outcomes (for instance simply by multiplying them),
a reliable analytical figure for the aggregated losses at any desired (high) percentile can be
derived.
This approach differs sharply from the conventional actuarial approach, where - except
for the rare case in which the expression for the compound distribution of the aggregated
losses is analytically derivable from the distributions of its components of frequency and
severity - the computation of a (high) percentile of the aggregated losses is obtained by
treating the estimate of the severity and the frequency components as a separate, disjointed,
problem and, afterwards, aggregating the corresponding outcomes using numerical,
                                                          
39 Obviously, appropriate expressions, alternative to (26), would be needed if different measures of risk (for
instance GPDES  or GPDVaR ) were adopted  in place of the GPDMS.61
approximation or simulation methods (i.e. the MonteCarlo procedure)
40. Owing to the
absence of an analytical basis, these methods require many steps to be generated to calculate
the highest percentiles of the aggregated distribution of losses
 41.
Moreover, even supposing that only the large losses constitute the input of the analysis
(for example the data exceeding the 90
th percentile of the empirical distribution) and that the
GPD is the selected distribution for the severity of the losses, whenever the frequency is
modelled by conventional actuarial models and an approximation or simulation method is
then implemented to derive the aggregated losses, the figure for the highest percentiles of the
aggregated losses (for example the 99
th or 99.9
th  ones) would be overestimated 
42. This
occurs because the frequency of large losses stemming from the procedure would be, on
average, anchored to the (higher) values observable in correspondence with the start of the
tail area (in this case, the 90
th percentile) wherein the data are more abundant. Not effectively
addressing the reduction of the frequency of large losses that occurs as their size increase
depends exclusively on the, disjointed and not analytical, method employed to compute the
aggregated losses; this may produce a significant bias in the estimate of the highest
percentiles.
The advantage of the POT approach in the estimate of the tail of the aggregated losses
therefore appears directly connected to the two following properties:
Property 1: the POT method takes into consideration the (unknown) relationship between
the frequency and the severity of large losses up to the end of the distribution;
                                                          
40 Under the condition of homogeneity of the actuarial risk model – i.e. with the loss severity variables (Xi)
i.i.d. and independent from the loss frequency variable (N) – the only quantities of the aggregated loss variable
(S) that are always analytically derivable from the distributions of frequency, P(N), and severity, F(X), are its
moments. In particular the expectation of total losses, E(S) – the so called net premium – can be obtained
simply as the product of the expectations of the frequency, E(N), and the severity, E(X). On the other hand, if
some specific ordinal statistic of S is to be computed (as VaRp or even ES p), it is necessary to identify the
complete form of the compound distribution of the total losses, S=Σ kP(k) F
k*(x),  where F
k*(x) is the k-fold
convolution of F(X). Since the compound distribution, S, can be represented in an analytical way only in very
rare cases, a MonteCarlo simulation is usually used. At each step, the MonteCarlo procedure generates a
number, n, of losses from P(n) and n amounts of losses, xi, from F(x) and then computes the additive quantity,
Sn=Σ i=1..nxi. Finally, from the empirical distribution of Sn it is possible to identify the desired percentile.
41 A MonteCarlo simulation performed by David Lawrence (Citigroup) and presented to the 10
th annual ICBI
conference in Geneva, 2003, showed that about 1,000,000 data points are required to calculate the 99
th
percentile of the aggregated losses, stemming from a compound Poisson (4000)-LogNormal (-4,1.8,3.5)
distribution. More data would be necessary to estimate equivalent or higher percentiles of compound
distributions originated from severity and frequency components with greater values of skewness and kurtosis.
42  This approach is largely adopted by practitioners. For theoretical references, see, inter alia, King, 2001.62
Property 2: the POT method makes it possible to employ a semiparametric approach to
compute the highest percentiles of the aggregated losses, hence reducing the computational
cost and the estimate error related to a not analytical representation of the aggregated losses
themselves. In the POT model, it suffices to select a suitable (high) threshold, on which basis
the model can be built and the relevant parameters estimated. Once the model is correctly
calibrated 
43, the total losses (and their percentiles) are easily obtainable by proper analytical
expressions.
Having said that, all the information required to get the capital charge for the BLs are
in Tables 9 and 11, which report, respectively, the tail-severity and the tail-frequency
magnitudes identified by the POT approach. For each BL, the adoption of a related measure
of risk to the “excess claims net premium” produces, as previously noted, the following
expressions:
CaRi =  () i GPD N MS
low
i for a typical domestic bank
CaRi =  () i GPD N MS
high
i for a typical international active bank
where CaR is the Capital at Risk and i ranges from the starting threshold, u (as
observed, close to the 90
th percentile for all the BLs, except for BL3, around the 96.5
th), to
that close to the 99.9
th  percentile.
The BLs capital charges for typical international active and domestic banks are
reported in Table 12, where, as anticipated in Section 9, the aggregated losses at the highest
levels of 99.5
th  and 99.9
th  are forced to make use of the frequency floor (i.e. the number of
exceedances identified by the POT-PP model at the 99
th percentile) in place of the (lower)
pertaining annualised intensities
44. In the last column of Table 12, the contribution of each
BL to the total capital charge is also reported.
                                                          
43 Depending on the data, it might be necessary, for instance, to relax the hypothesis of  homogeneity of the
parameters in order to incorporate a trend  in the model (see footnote 34).
44 Although this assumption violates the Property 1 of the POT model, it seems a reasonable compromise
between the objectives of circumventing the problem of the, likely, incompleteness in the frequency of the
largest losses in the 2002 LDCE (as noted in Section 9) and not introducing a too high level of discretionality in
the determination of the extreme percentiles of the total losses.
Generally speaking, as the data collection is reputed less satisfactory, a proportionally higher floor for the
frequency to be associated to the highest percentiles of the severity should be adopted. However, in order to not63
Table 12: BLs capital charge
Typical international active bank (Euro ,000)
Typical domestic bank (Euro ,000)
(*) As the starting threshold for Retail Banking is close to the 96.5
th  percentile, the CaR is constant below this level.
The findings clearly indicate that operational losses are a significant source of risk for
banks: overall, the 99.9
th, 1-year period, CaR amounts to € 1,325 million for a typical
international active bank and to € 296 million for a typical domestic bank. Owing to the
                                                                                                                                                                                  
enlarge the final aggregated figure excessively, this “rule of thomb” should also establish a minimum, preset,
level (for example the 95
th percentile) at which the frequence floor can be derived (as an example, interested
readers can verify the increase of the 99.9
th  capital charges that would derive from setting the floor equivalent
to the number of exceedances pertaining to the 90
th percentile (N90°) instead of the current (N99°)).






floor = N99. 
% on Total
BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 4,859 8,192 8,837 10,253 11,458 12,587 17,147 19,693 75,116 175,676 13.3%
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 9,205 15,199 16,539 18,593 20,710 24,209 27,608 34,027 54,687 218,423 16.5%
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 
(*) 14,459 14,459 14,459 16,320 20,715 25,142 27,280 29,629 51,860 298,218 22.5%
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  8,494 14,209 17,605 21,030 25,919 33,707 40,980 60,198 66,376 257,633 19.4%
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 1,599 2,781 3,035 3,314 3,927 4,728 5,713 8,515 12,244 100,052 7.6%
BL 6  (Agency Services)  5,058 8,789 9,827 11,185 13,245 15,142 17,707 20,661 34,296 78,886 6.0%
BL 7  (Asset Management) 2,527 3,549 3,730 3,820 3,830 3,727 3,237 2,429 12,389 73,237 5.5%
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 5,065 7,551 8,026 8,581 8,883 9,262 9,419 9,290 21,469 122,788 9.3%
TOTAL  51,267 74,729 82,059 93,097 108,687 128,503 149,090 184,442 328,437 1,324,912 100%






floor = N99. 
% on Total
BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 1,087 1,832 1,976 2,293 2,562 2,815 3,834 4,404 16,798 39,286 13.3%
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 2,111 3,486 3,793 4,264 4,750 5,552 6,332 7,804 12,543 50,097 16.9%
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 
(*) 2,895 2,895 2,895 3,267 4,147 5,033 5,461 5,932 10,382 59,702 20.2%
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  2,093 3,501 4,337 5,181 6,386 8,305 10,096 14,831 16,353 63,474 21.5%
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 400 696 760 829 983 1,183 1,430 2,131 3,064 25,036 8.5%
BL 6  (Agency Services)  1,053 1,829 2,045 2,328 2,756 3,151 3,685 4,300 7,137 16,417 5.6%
BL 7  (Asset Management) 616 865 909 931 933 908 789 592 3,018 17,841 6.0%
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 981 1,463 1,555 1,663 1,721 1,795 1,825 1,800 4,160 23,791 8.0%
TOTAL  11,235 16,566 18,270 20,756 24,238 28,742 33,452 41,793 73,455 295,644 100%64
higher frequency of occurrence of losses, Retail Banking and Commercial Banking are the
BLs which absorb the majority of the overall capital figure (about 20 per cent each in both
the groups), while Corporate Finance and Trading & Sales come in at an intermediate level
(respectively close to 13 per cent and 17 per cent). The other BLs stay stably below 10 per
cent in both the groups, with Asset Management and Agency Services showing the smallest
capital charges (around 6 per cent each). These figures are comparable with the allocation
ratios of economic capital for operational risk reported by the banks participating in the 2002
LDCE (see Table 21 of the 2002 LDCE summary).
The last part of this Section is devoted to measuring, for an international active bank,
the contribution of the expected losses to the overall capital figures.
In fact, as stated in Section 5, the results of the conventional inference support the
hypothesis that, in each BL, the small/medium-sized operational risk data (i.e. the body of
the loss distribution) have a different statistical “soul” than the tail-data. This means that the
outcomes of the GPD analysis - in particular the implausible implications for any mean
value of the distribution, owing to an estimate of the shape parameter (ξ) higher or close to 1
- are not applicable to the body-data. Therefore, by focusing the analysis on the body-data
only and making use of the conventional inference, an estimate of the operational risk
expected  severity is tenable in each BL: in particular, the results of the LogNormal model
are used (see Table 3), since this distribution proved to have satisfactory properties in
representing the small/medium-sized area of the data.
Besides, in order to gain information on the (1-year) frequency of occurrence of the
small/medium-sized losses, for each BL, the Poisson and the Binomial Negative
distributions are fitted to the per-bank number of losses having a single-impact magnitude
lower than the threshold identified in the GPD analysis. For all the BLs with the exception of
Retail Banking, the Binomial Negative curve shows a more accurate fit, in consideration of
the substantial skewness to the right of the frequency of data: accordingly, BLs related
parameters estimate for the Binomial Negative models are gained.
The average values of the LogNormal and Binomial Negative models, arisen from the
estimated parameters, are consequently assumed to represent, respectively, the expected65
severity and the expected frequency of the operational risk datasets 
45. The expected losses
are obtained by the simple product of these values.
For each BL, Table 13 shows the LogNormal parameters already computed in Section
4 and the Binomial Negative parameters just now estimated. In the last two columns, the
CaR at the 99.9
th  percentile (with frequency floor at N99°) and the ratio between the expected
losses and the CaR is reported.
Table 13: BLs expected losses (absolute and relative to CaR99.9) (Euro, 000)
                                                          
45 For  Retail Banking, both the Poisson and the Binomial Negative models show a low performance;
consequently the figure for the expected frequency in each BL is gained by an empirical estimate of the average
number of small/medium-sized losses borne by the banks providing data to that BL.











BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 3.58 1.71 0.59 0.04 154 12.67 1,953 175,676 1.1%
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 3.64 1.27 0.45 0.01 85 74.45 6,359 218,423 2.9%
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 3.17 0.97 n.a. n.a. 38 347.45 13,172 298,218 4.4%
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  3.61 1.41 0.52 0.01 100 43.90 4,405 257,633 1.7%
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 3.37 1.10 0.61 0.02 53 32.00 1,711 100,052 1.7%
BL 6  (Agency Services) 3.74 1.28 0.47 0.01 96 35.03 3,375 78,886 4.3%
BL 7  (Asset Management) 3.79 1.28 0.60 0.03 100 20.02 2,011 73,237 2.7%







The results reveal the very small contribution of the expected losses to the total charge:
on average over the BLs it is less than 3 per cent (CaR99.9/EL = 36), with a minimum of 1.1
per cent in Corporate Finance (CaR99.9/EL= 89) and a maximum of 4.4 per cent in Retail
Banking (CaR99.9/EL = 22) 
46.
Once again, these outcomes confirm the very tail-driven nature of operational risk.
11. Business Lines capital charge and Gross Income relationship: bottom-up
coefficients
The exercise performed in this Section is limited to the “upper group” of banks, which,
as previously noted, is assumed to contain the internationally active banks. Not enough
information is available in the database to carry out a similar analysis on the “lower group”
of banks, which is supposed to contain the domestic banks.
The objective of the analysis is to determine for each BL (and in the eight BLs as a
whole) the relationship between the capital charge required to an international active bank to
cover (expected plus unexpected) operational risk losses and the value of an indicator
measuring the average business produced in that BL. The indicator of volume of business
chosen is the Gross Income (GI), that it the variable identified by the Basel Committee to
derive the regulatory coefficients in the simpler approaches (Basic and Standardised) of the
new Capital Accord framework.
Therefore, for each BL, an average GI is obtained from the individual GIs of the banks
which furnished operational risk data to that BL; the total GI across the eight BLs is obtained
as the simple sum of these average figures. Then the ratios between the BLs capital charges
(CaR99.9)  and the average GIs are computed and compared with the current regulatory
coefficients envisaged in the Basic and Standardised Approach of the Capital Accord (the
so-called Alpha and Betas; see Table 14).
                                                          
46 The same analysis carried out on the “lower group” of banks (the domestic banks) reveals a slightly larger
contribution of the expected losses to the total capital charge: on average they measure about 12 per cent of the
CaR99.9 (with frequency floor N99°), with a minimum of 5 per cent in Corporate Finance and a maximum of 22
per cent in Retail Banking.67
Table 14: BLs capital charge and Gross Income relationship (Euro ,000).
Bottom-up coefficients vs. current regulatory coefficients
The results indicate that, for an international active bank, the BLs overall capital
charge amounts to 13.3 per cent of the GI, a figure slightly lower than the value of 15 per
cent envisaged in the Basic Approach. On the other hand, there is a more marked variety of
ratios across the BLs. In particular Retail Banking shows the lowest ratio (below 10 per cent)
and Payments & Settlements the highest (above 30 per cent), Trading & Sales, Commercial
Banking, Asset Management and Corporate Finance are in a medium-low area (around 15
per cent) while Retail Brokerage and Agency Services are in a medium-high region (about 20
per cent).
12. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to illustrate the methodology and the outcomes of the
inferential analysis carried out on the operational risk data collected by the RMG through
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BL 1  (Corporate Finance) 33 175,676 1,056,568 16.6% 18%
BL 2  (Trading & Sales) 67 218,423 1,723,483 12.7% 18%
BL 3  (Retail Banking) 80 298,218 3,580,369 8.3% 12%
BL 4  (Commercial Banking)  73 257,633 1,829,454 14.1% 15%
BL 5  (Payment & Settlement) 55 100,052 300,153 33.3% 18%
BL 6  (Agency Services) 40 78,886 375,638 21.0% 15%
BL 7  (Asset Management) 52 73,237 454,130 16.1% 12%
BL 8  (Retail Brokerage) 41 122,788 632,445 19.4% 12%
TOTAL 1,324,912 9,952,241 13.3% 15%68
conventional actuarial distributions and models stemming from the Extreme Value Theory
(EVT) in representing the extreme percentiles of the data sets (i.e. the large losses). Then,
measures of severity and frequency of the large losses in each data set were gained and, by a
proper combination of these estimates, a bottom-up operational risk capital charge was
computed. Finally, for each BL and in the eight BLs as a whole, the contributions of the
expected losses to the capital figures were evaluated and the relationships between the
capital charges and the corresponding average level of Gross Incomes were determined.
From a statistical point of view, the results indicate a low performance of conventional
severity models in describing the overall data characteristics, summarizable in very high
levels of both skewness to the right and kurtosis. In fact any traditional distribution applied
to all the data in each BL tends to fit the central observations, hence failing to take the
extreme percentiles into adequate consideration. On the other hand, the exercise shows that
the Extreme Value model,  in its Peaks Over Thresholds representation, explains the
behaviour of the operational risk data in the tail area well.
Moreover, in the conventional actuarial approach, the distribution of the aggregated
losses is usually obtained by treating the estimate of its severity and frequency components
as a separate, disjointed, problem and, afterwards, aggregating the corresponding outcomes
using not analytical methods. One of the main remarks coming out of this paper is that, if the
aim of the analysis is to estimate the extreme percentiles of the aggregated losses, the
treatment of these two components within a single overall estimation problem may reduce
the estimate error and the computational costs 
47. The Peaks Over Thresholds approach
appears to be a suitable and consistent statistical tool to tackle this issue, since it takes into
account the (unknown) relationship between the frequency and the severity of large losses up
to the end of the distribution and hence makes it possible to employ a semiparametric
approach to compute any high percentile of the aggregated losses.
As the exercise makes clear, the EVT analysis requires that specific conditions be
fulfilled in order to be worked out, the most important of which are the i.i.d. assumptions for
the data and, as concerns the GPD model, a satisfactory stability of the inference to an
                                                          
47   The extent of the estimate error which derives from employing approximation or simulation methods, as the
MonteCarlo procedure, for the detection of high percentiles of the operational risk aggregated losses will be
matter of  a next paper.69
increase of the pre-set (high) threshold. Actually, this seems to be the case for each BL data
set that originates from pooling the operational risk losses collected through the 2002 LDCE.
In any case, it should borne in mind that, even if suitable tools are available in the Extreme
Value literature for handling data with specific characteristics (such as trend, seasonality and
clustering), a high sensitivity of the model remains for the largest observed losses and the
very extreme quantile estimates.  As Embrechts states (see Embrechts et al., 1997): “The
statistical reliability of these estimates becomes very difficult to judge in general. Though we
can work out approximate confidence intervals for these estimators, such constructions
strongly rely on mathematical assumptions which are unverifiable in practice”.
Concerning the outcomes of the analysis, there is clear evidence of the considerable
magnitude of operational risk in the businesses carried out by the 2002 LDCE banks as well
as of the differences in the riskiness of the BLs (in terms of both the time-unconditional
severity and the 1-year aggregated capital figure). These differences persist after comparing,
for a typical international active bank, the BLs capital figures with the average Gross
Incomes and obtaining ratios as the coefficients set in the revised framework of the Capital
Accord. In practice, the bottom-up analysis of the 2002 LDCE data suggests that the actual
operational riskiness of the BLs may be captured in a more effectively way by setting, for
the regulatory coefficients of the Standardised Approach, a wider range than the current one;
besides, for the eight BLs as a whole, the implied capital ratio results to be a slightly lower
figure than the coefficient envisaged in the Basic Approach.
Anyway, as frequently noted along this paper, the soundness of the exercise relies on
the (unknown) actual quality of the data provided by the banks participating in the 2002
LDCE. In light of that, it would be extremely valuable that, in the course of the
implementation of the new Capital Accord and when more data will be available to
individual banks, consortia, academic circles, etc., the people involved in the quantification
of operational risk make use of the statistical model implemented in this exercise to get
pertinent figures of BLs capital charges and implied coefficients and hence test the
robustness of the model itself and the consistency of its outcomes.References
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